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There are some militarists who say:
"We are not interested in politics but only in
the profession of arms." It is vital these
s impl e-mi nded mi 1 i tar i s t s be made to realize
the relationship that exists between
politics and military affairs. Military
action is amethod used to attain a political
goa 1. While military affairs and political
affairs are not identical, it is impossible
to isolate one from the other.
Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, 1937
The mode of being the new intellectual can no
longer consist in eloquence,
. . . but in
active participation in practical life, as
constructor, organizer, and "permanent
persuader .
"
(Gramsci
)
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INTRODUCTION
This paper will consist of three major parts: an introduction to the
history
,
concepts and practice of polwar from its inception in the Russian Red
Army to its introduction to non-Corrmunist military forces; a rather detailed
description of the Repub 1 ic of Vietnam Armed Forces General Political Warfare
system; and finally, conclusions drawn from those two parts as to the
appl icabi lity of a type of polwar system for the armed forces of a contempor-
ary third world member (Egypt) of the "free" nations of the world.
In my introduction I will discuss briefly the genealogy of the term
pol i t ical war fare or "polwar" as it has come to be used by the US government in
an esoteric sense, that is, in the politicization of military forces as an
attempt to achieve certain fundamental goals (such as loyalty) within those
forces
.
The basic concept of polwar originated with the Russian corrmissar
system, giving the political cadre absolute control over the corrmunist
revolutionary armed forces, thus making them a decisive tool for the
preservation of the Corrmunist Party's power. In 1924, the concept was
introduced in China by Russian advisors, and later was revised and has been
used to the present t ime by bo th the Corrmuni s t Chinese and the Nat iona lists in
forms modi fied to conform to their respect ive ideologies . ( See Appendix D.
)
The polwar system introduced to the Republic of Vietnam in 1960 was
adapted from the Nationalist Chinese system. Although the pr imary mi ss ion
of the Vietnamese system was ensuring the loyalty of their own armed forces,
two additional tasks were included in the charter: gaining and maintaining
1
2the support of the civilian populace in both friendly and eneny controlled
areas and destroying the loyalty of the enemy. These latter missions were
the responsibility of the psychological warfare element of the General
Political Warfare Department. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army
polwar organizations were tailored after the Corrmunist Chinese system.
The South Vietnamese polwar system failed with its armed forces, but
this failure does not invalidate the concept. The Nationalist Chinese
system, the only formalized system outside the corrmunist orbit (with the
possible exception of Israel about whose internal military affairs little is
known), still is in place and keeping its military house in order. The
question remains therefore: Would such a system have application and
benef i t today for other countries of the " f ree wor Id , " especial ly those with
large standing military forces? This thesis is based on that inquiry.
We mus t begin by providing a clear definition of this somewhat confusing
term, political warfare, or polwar, the abbreviated form which the acronymi-
cal ly-minded Americans who have had to deal wi th the phenomenon have given us.
Here I should digress briefly to point out that of the Americans who have dealt
with the sub jec t mos t have done so apa thet ical ly
,
many with distaste, a number
with outright revulsion. To most Americans, and especially those in the
armed forces, polwar is a sort of "alien corn," something, after all, that was
a Russian invention, and a corrmunist one at that. The fact that it was
adopted by Asians, and first by Asian corrmuni sts
,
doesn't make it any more
digestible. All this is reinforced by the fact that the members of the armed
forces ( and general popu 1 ace as we 1 1 ) of any count ry such as the United States
which presupposes the loyalty, stability and affirmative response of its
3armed forces considers resort to such devices as internal propaganda,
political supervision of leaders and outright spying on individual soldiers
reprehensible
.
The distinction between political warfare (traditionally) and the sense
used in this paper is one of focus. While we usually think of political
warfare as international conflict involving the broad spectrum of assets
available to most nat ions--diplomat ic
,
economic, military, and so on--to
pursue their objectives, polwar in its military sense may be defined as:
An organizational attempt to solve deep-
rooted non-combat military problems centered on
questions of loyalty or allegiance and civil-
military relations, as well as the traditional
problems of corruption, despotism, nepotism,
mutiny, desertion, morale and soldier-dependent
social welfare needs .
*
As I have pointed out, the difference mainly is one of focus; while the
"military" is merely one asset in the conduct of political warfare in the
broader
,
more usual sense, the military (the forces of a given country), in
the esoteric sense, is the asset of interest, and pr imar ily only with respect
to its structure and interna 1 operat ions
.
The unfortunate choice of termin-
ology originated with the General Political Warfare Department of the
Nationalist Chinese defense ministry,* and when the Chinese system was
introduced in South Vietnam the same name was adopted. When, in the early
1960s, the Americans began "advising" the Vietnamese military they, with
their penchant for the "bumper s t i cker " -"buzz word" language so prevalent
today, coined the word, always capitalized, Polwar. I have included this
last fact only because on subsequent pages of this paper the term may be seen
capitalized on reproductions of US government documents.
* Chiang Kai-shek is credited with inventing the term, Political warfare, as
it is used in this thesis.
4I have selected Egypt as a possible candidate for polwar because the
problems within Egypt's Central Security Forces which led to the uprising of
February, 1986 cons i s ted main ly of those I have described above. They do not
comprise all the problems that exist within that organization; nor have I
discussed, or even alluded to, the internal problems of the rest of Egypt's
armed forces. I will deal with this subject in Chapter III of this paper
which will examine also the possibility, des i reabi 1 i ty and feasibility of
introducing a polwar system into the Egyptian armed forces
,
one "tai lored" to
suit Egypt's national interest as well as that of the US and the West.
In Chapter II of this paper the Republic of Vietnam's psychological
warfare element, a part of its polwar organization, will be discussed, along
with propaganda, one of the primary instruments of "psywar." Psychological
operations, a term used by US practitioners, also will be mentioned. All
these terms warrant clarification.*
The terms psychological warfare and psychological operations, though
frequently used interchangeably--and what is worse, held by some to be
synonymous with propaganda--can be more clearly and specifically defined.
Psychological warfare or psywar, in the official US government sense, may be
defined as the planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions
(such as terrorism) having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions,
emot ions
,
at t i tudes and behavior of foreign hostile groups in such a way as to
suppor t the achievement of nat ional objectives. While psychological opera-
tions (again, in the US view) or psyop, may include psywar, they are broader
* The basis and sources for this explanation of these terms may be found in my
essay "Propaganda: The Rhetoric of Power," UMASS, Amherst, 16 December
1986.
5in scope in that they encompass also those political, economic and
ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral or friendly
groups the emotions, attitudes and behavior to support the same objectives.
United States advisors introduced psywar to the South Vietnamese not long
after the French de feat in I ndoch i na
;
it was all the Amer i cans (or the Wes tern
powers for that matter) had to offer in the way of "mind warfare." The Viet
Minh, victorious in their 1 ong an t i-colonial war
,
owed much o f the i r success
to the successful use of their polwar system, which they had had the wi sdom to
adopt as ear ly as 1938 from the Communist Chinese. The South Vietnamese saw
that the US system was inadequate to their needs
;
the Nationalist Chinese were
still in the process of developing their "free world" system, but the
Vietnamese, understandably, realized that they could hardly adopt a commun-
ist system, much less go to the enemy for advice and assistance. In Taiwan,
Chiang Kai-shek, in more peaceful circumstances, could claim his right to
polwar as a "latent legacy." After all, was he not the first commandant of
the first polwar academy (inspired by the Russian communists in 1924) in
China? Quite reasonably, the Vietnamese turned to him when, by the early
1960s, he had perfected his system. At that time the US-inspired psywar of
the 1950s became subordinated to the overall polwar organization. The South
Vietnamese never adopted the more definitive term, psyop. The South Viet-
namese effort targeted all groups and made no distinction between "psywar"
and "psyop."
Interestingly, although the US government's official position is that
psyop i s not usedwithin the US, and although the use of propaganda directed at
US citizens anywhere has been outlawed by Congress (PL 102), the course of
6events seems to disprove this; the Iran-contra affair, which still rages at
this writing, is a classic example among, undoubtedly, many.
While it would appear that there are almost as many definitions of
propaganda as there are people who have written about i t
,
and while there are
those who even claim that everything is propaganda (such as Jacques
Driencourt) and some who, because definition is so difficult, have abandoned
the term altogether, the definition adopted by the US Institute for Military
Ass i stance--which has overall responsibility for psywar (US definition) at
the nat ional level and partial responsibi lity (military aspects ) for psyop--
is adequate for the purpose of this paper: "any information, ideas,
doctrines or special appeals in support of national objectives, designed to
influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behavior of any specified
group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly." The
phrase "and behavior" obviously is of great importance since, even with an
attitudinal change, some sort of action is necessary to achieve the desired
objectives
.
A word on sources is necessary. The reader wi 1 1 not ice that in Chapter
II of this paper
,
the part which describes in some detail the polwar system of
the Republic of Vietnam, few citations are made and a number of charts or
organizational diagrams are provided to simplify understanding the rather
technical descriptions of the text. The written text is based, with the
exception of some speculative or philosophical passages taken from memories
of my experiences in Vietnam or from journals or diaries I kept there, almost
exclusively from official handbooks, reports, narrative lesson manuscripts
which I produced while at the JFK Center for Military Assistance at Ft.
7Bragg, North Carolina, and briefings, many of which I attended, given by
representatives of the Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of China and the
United States. To have attempted to cite each source (in some cases
literally scraps of yellowed paper) would have produced a plethora of notes
(and corresponding numbers) i ncomnensurate with the size and format of this
work. Reproductions of the organizational diagrams of the RVNAF units and
agencies were taken from the Political Warfare Handbook for Advisors
,
published by the US Army Institute for Military Assistance at Ft. Bragg, in
1970; those relating to ROC polwar were taken from a briefing report (dated 15
Augus t 1964) entitled Info rma tion Briefing on the Genera 1 Political War fare
Department, Ministry of Defense, Republic of China." (This applies to the
Appendices as well.) The textual information on the organization and
functions of both the RVN and ROC systems was obtained in large part from those
two sources. None of the information used is classified or, if it was at one
time, has been declassified.
Recently, a scholar with humourous inclinations said to me, "today,
taking f rom one source is cons idered plagiarism, while taking from a dozen or
more is called research. " This remark
,
though humourous
,
may have at least a
kernal of truth, depending upon the "one source." A scholarly book by Carmen
Haider--Do We Want Fasci sm? --pub 1 i shed in 1934, which describes the Italian
Fascismof the period, contained four footnotes among 274 pages.* The author
had spent a year in Italy accumulating her information; her sources,
therefore, were of the best (if she is to be believed). Without putting too
fine a point on the matter, I think the final word as to my inquiry about the
practicability of po lwar in the "free wor Id" today mus t be : 1 am the pr ima ry
* Carmen Haider, Do We Want Fascism?, New York, John Day, 1934.
8source for this work. All I can add to this is that although it has been said
also that today academicians and other scholars write only for their peers (I
am indifferent to the possible val idi ty of this statement), I hope that what I
have written will be understandable and perhaps of use to the "acting laiety."
Finally, a cautionary note. Because this thesis concentrates so
intensively on polwar as a possible means of strengthening and stabilizing
those countries which, while developing economically, socially and
politically, maintain large military forces (for various reasons), and are
striving genuinely to improve the condition of their people, there may be a
tendency on the part of the reader to feel that polwar is suggested as an
instant cure for all the ills of the "third world." Obviously, a number of
factors mus t obt a i n if such a system is to play a successful support ing role - -
the justice and fairness of US foreign policy toward the country of interest,
legitimate constitution of that country's government, and proper planning,
organization and supervision of assistance and advisory efforts on the part
of the US or its allies are a few. Po lwar
,
in itself, mus t not be seen as an
Yggsdras ill
,
the imassive tree of Norse legend whose great roots and branches
hold together the universe.
CHAPTER I --GENES IS
The Red Army and Birth of Pol war
Following the successful initial stage of the Bolshevik revolution in
the Autumn of 1917, the new revolutionary government in Russia, recognizing
that absolute loyalty was essential among its soldiers, laid the foundation
for a new army. The problem confronting the new leaders was in adapting
efficiently the positive aspects of the old imperialist army to what they
referred to as the "armed section" of the proletariat. Above all, the new
army had to be a political one, "the expression of the proletariat and the
creature of the party. "2 its creation was announced by decree signed on 28
January 1918,3 just prior to demobilization of what was left of the Russian
Imper i al Army (lOFebruary). The nucleus of the new organ ization, official-
ly named "The Red Army of Workers and Peasants," was made up of "worthwhile"
sections of the "army of the revolution," that is, "the Red Guards and the
politically 'conscious' soldiers" of the old Czarist army. 4 As Michael
Garder writes:
Initially it was an egalitarian militia
recruited on a voluntary basis and with elected
leaders (one could not yet speak of officers).
This militia reflected the ideas of Lenin and the
majority of the leadership about the form of the
armed forces of the proletariat. Experience, and
the realism with which this exper ience was exploi t -
ed
,
was soon to change these ideas.
We should keep in mind the last sentence of this quotation.
One thing was certain : the new revolutionary government needed an army
urgently; amid the confusion of pos t -revolut ionary events and during the
"consolidation" phase of the political reorganization of the huge Russian
9
10
land mass, the success or failure of total transition to conmuni sm would
depend upon the creation of an efficient, high 1 y mot ivated
,
and absolutely
loyal armed force.
The treaty of Brest-Li tovsk
,
signed on 3 March 1918, which amounted to a
German Diktat
,
speeded up the collapse of the old Czarist empire. The
Ukrainians procla imed their i ndependence and cone 1 uded a s epa rate peace with
Germany; the Poles, who had experienced unity during the German occupation,
stood firm in the hope of achieving national sovereignty, while the Finns and
the Baltic provinces broke from Russia. Separate republics emerged in the
Caucasus
,
the people of the Don River basin equivocated
,
and in Siberia, where
the Czechoslovakian Army Corps opposed the Reds, there was even more
confusion. 6 Russia was not to "turn red" overnight. Garder notes:
Almost everywhere centres of counter-revolu-
tion sprang up: secret associations of all politi-
cal tendencies (monarchists, liberals, social
revolutionaries). The Allies, faced wi th the fai t
accompli of the 'betrayal of Brest-Li tovsk , ' were
open 1 y host i 1 e towards the new regime . Anarchy and
lawless power everywhere ruled supreme. The trial
of strength which the new government had to face was
very different from that of November 7, 1917.
^
He cont inues
,
"the implacable will and the cold logic of Lenin
,
together with
the unbounding energy and supple intel 1 igence of the realistic Trotsky, were
to make the Red Army-- the ir creation--tri umphant in the end . " 8 How did they
,
in the face of obstacles which seemed insurmountable, achieve this triumph?
On 4 March a military-political organization was created with the
purpose of organizing the Red Army; on 13 March, Leon Trotsky, then the
People's Conmissar for War, and a longtime advocate of conscription, strict
discipline and professional officershipas essentials for a regular army , was
appointed chairman of this Supreme War Council. Trotsky argued that as
11
industry needs engineers, as farming needs qualified agronomists, so mili-
tary specialists are indispensable to defence. "9 Trotsky was contemptuous
of the amateurism of the month-old revolutionary "militia" which though
dynamic in its nucleus was little disciplined in its ranks; he rejected the
idea of a proletarian army, an army which in theory was to be led and
disciplined through revolutionary zeal
. Trotsky argued that the old Czarist
officers, many of whom held Kerensky and his short-lived provisional
gove r nment respons ible for the catast rophe that had befallen the a rmy and the
count ry, should be u t i 1 i zed to provide the necessary techn ical experience for
the new army. Though his opponents argued that these officers could not be
t rusted Trotsky pres eve red and " r ecr ui tment " (ins uch forms as volunteering,
compuls ion and threats--in many cases fami lies were held hostage) began. In
1918 alone the former czarist officers "provided more than three-quarters of
the conmanding and administrative staffs of the Red Army. "10 The elective
system, which was a genuinely free system and wherein anyone from the ranks
could become a leader of troops, was a thing of the past. Trotsky had
es tabl i shed the first of the three elements whi ch were to make the new Red Army
success ful --prof ess ional i sm. His action came none too soon, as former
officers of the old regime's army were joining the counterrevolutionaries
everywhere in Russ i a . 1 1 To counter this threat newl y formed Red Army uni t s--
brigades, divisions, armies--under the new leadership of experts began to
appear everywhere.
On 4 April 1918 a corps of political conmissars was created, and a few
days later military regions were set up with wards and districts subordinate
to them. Purposeful 1 y , these regions did not coincidewith the boundaries of
the soviet republics wh i ch had been the dec 1 a red aim of the Bolshevik 1 eader s ,
12
thereby giving the party more centralized political control over the
country. 12 Each of the regional offices (and their subheadquarters) was
headed by three "functionaries": a professional officer from the old army,
and two political conmissars for military affairs whose loyalty to the party
was considered unquest ionabl e . 1 3 Although Trotsky acknowledged that the
professional officership made a fundamental contribution to winning the
civil war against the counterrevolutionaries, he was, at the same time,
determined that this should be a "class" army. As Ian Grey tells us:
(Trotsky) depended on the hard core of dedi-
cated members of the communist party, and up to half
of the total party membership served in the army.
He insisted that the new army must never challenge
or undermine the revolution. 14
Understandably, relations between themilitary leaders and the commis-
sars often were s trained
,
espec ially in the earlier stages of this new system;
one need have little knowledge of or experience in the military to appreciate
the a 1 1 i t ude of professi ona 1 soldiers being super vi sed by amateurs
,
no mat ter
how we 1 1 -meaning they may be. But Trotsky realized this also. According to
Fedotoff White, Trotsky dictated that:
in purely military matters, in all operations
,
work
and combat problems
,
the last work was left
. . . to
the military specialists. The political commis-
sars were instructed not to interfere with opera-
tion orders of the military specialists. Their
signatures on military documents merely signified
that the given order was not a counter-revolut ion-
1 S
ary device.
And eventually relationships began to improve, mutual respect evolved and
with it greater understanding and the coordination necessary to achieve the
overall objective: the preservation of the tenuous, newly-formed govern-
ment . But Garde r probab 1 y tells it best, and deserves to be quoted at length
.
13
The corrmissar was there certainly to supervise
the 'chief'
,
but he was there equally to support and
aid him. It was he who, in the name of the party,
enforced discipline, approved and had executed the
orders of an 'aristocrat' and imposed him on the
proletariat. Thanks to the corrmissar, an iron
discipline was re-established. The former
officers who had suffered so much during the period
of anarchy in 1917 began to experience respect for
their newmasters. As psycho-political officer of
the unit, the corrmissar played a considerable role
on themoral plane. Themasses
,
who had so abruptly
lost the motive for action when the old motto ' God
,
Tsar, Fatherland' disappeared, found, in the exhor-
tations of the corrmissar, a new revolutionary
faith. 16
Thus Trotsky established his second formula for success: the use of
political corrmissars to ensure loyalty to the new government (in actuality,
and as the system has worked to the present day, to the party). From this
point onward the Soviet Army has had a form of dual leadership. At times
(usually during war, civil or otherwise) the military expert has more power
than at others; sometimes, the political "amateur" becomes so proficient in
military mat ter s that he may di scharge strictlymilitary duties in addi t ion
to his political ones. In such a case, the system is termed a unified one
where
,
for example
,
the political officer of
,
let us say
,
a bat tal ion
,
serves
in actuality as the unit's executive officer, or second in corrmand. Other-
wise the system can be called dual or parallel wherein a separate political
system exists alongside the military "chain of corrmand." Whatever the case,
some form of political supervision exists to ensure that loyalty or relia-
bility, which is essential to keeping the ruling group in place. With the
Russian revolutionaries this security was so important that in some of the
major units ( army, army group or fronts) members of the Bolshevik leadership
itself served as corrmissars.
14
But the system of "psycho-political" corrmissars was considered, in
itself, not adequate to the task of providing this vital security. The
leaders saw from the outset that a final "fail safe" system or organization
was needed, one that would ensure even the loyalty of the corrmissars. Enter
Felix Dzerzhinsky and the "all-Russian extraordinary commission to fight
counter-revolution and sabotage," or Cheka
,
the third and final element of
the newly-formed Red Army.
The Cheka had been created, again by decree of the newly established
Bolshevik government, on 7 December 1917, with Dzerzhinsky, an idealistic
Pole and tried and true revolutionary, at its head. Initially the Cheka was
concerned only with the civilian sector, but with the army's increasing
opera t ions in the civil war ( coupl edwith the fact that there was no counter-
espionage organization worthy of the name in the Red Army) the Cheka, whose
civilian res pons ibi lities often overlapped the army' s area of interest, soon
penetrated the military structure at every level. Today's KGU (internal)
and KGB (external) "security" organizations grew out of the Cheka. 1”
And so, as Garder sums it up, "with the commissar, the voenspet
s
(military specialist) and the cheki st
,
three fundamental factors of the Red
tt 1 8
Army make their appearance: enthusiasm, expert knowledge and terror."
In order to acquire a clearer understanding of all polwar organizations
some discussion of basic structural concepts is needed. The fundamental
alternatives for polwar organization are a unified (or intergrated) system
and a parallel or dual system. In the unified system the political officers
serve in two capacities: as political officers and as regular executive
officers or deputies, with the traditional duties of those latter assignments
under the unit commander. They serve, in other words, a dual role, which is
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not to be confused with the dual system
. This latter organizational and
functional concept is one wherein the entire structure of political officers
and cadre as a separate hierarchy is superimposed on the military one, each
unit at all levels down to company having a political officer pe£ se attached
but distinct from the purely military hierarchy and responsible only for
polwar requirements, tasks and supervision. In this case the polwar of ficer
is responsible to the unit corrmander for providing the necessary polwar
support and responsible also to the next echelon's polwar officer for
accomplishing his part of the overall polwar mission.
In the unified system the polwar officer is answerable to his corrmanding
officer for accomplishing the duties of second- i n-corrmand (corrmon to all
executive officers or deput ies in allmilitary forces) and providing him with
polwar support. Nonetheless he is responsible to the GPWD (at national
level), through his counterparts, up through the military hierarchy, for
accompl ishing the polwar mission, i.e., strictly for polwarmatters. As did
the South V ietnamese later on, the ROC armed forces adopted a system combining
both concepts : down to regimental level the dual system was used (aside from
reasons of prestige, at that level and higher the polwar officer's is a full
t ime job ) ; be 1 ow tha t , the uni f ied system. Use of the uni f i ed sys tern, having
the polwar officer integrated into the unit, is the prefer red mode
;
there is
no disagreement on this. One may recall the contempt in which Nazi Gestapo
officers were held by most German officers who had to tolerate their ferret-
like security tactics. The unified system engenders more mutual trust,
simplifies mission accomplishment by simplifying coordination, and saves
manpower. A more subtle but extremely important benefit lies in the fact
that it makes the polwar officer more of a team member ; 1 9 this is good for both
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hismorale and that of the troops, and itmakes him seemingly
,
if not actually,
more accessible to the members of the command as well as more quickly aware of
problems which may grow worse without his immediate attention. Finally, it
enables him to be in a position where he may be more intimately aware of the
actions, opinions, perhaps even the thoughts of the unit commander.
Although less desirable, there are times when the dual system must or
should be used, such as when the political officers are unqualified through
lack of military experience or training, or both, to serve in a purely
military role, or when their polwar duties are so demanding that they have
time for little else (as in the case of officers at regimental or higher
level). Add i t i ona 1 1 y , if the military 1 eader s do not have the full trust of
the government in power it would be inadvisable to place the polwar officers
(possibly at any level) in such close subordination to them. As to this
latter case the Russians are a good example. Initially, Trotsky used the
dual system; later, after the civil war--during which the political commis-
sars acqui red some military knowledge
,
i f not expert i se
,
and when many of them
began trusting and working well with their military counterpar ts--the
Soviets adopted a unified system. Depending upon the times the Soviet system
has been seen to shift. In the later 1930s during the Stalin purges when some
eighty percent of the officer corps was under suspicion, the dual system
reappeared; during the second World War when, in desperation, all Russians
desirous of preserving their homeland had to cooperate and there was little
time for discussing political subtleties, they went back to the unified
system (which is in place today).
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Finally, it must be understood that the scope of polwar activity
dictates the extent and complexity of the organization. The Russians
invented polwar as a system of ensuring that their new revolutionary army
would be loyal and responsive to the politics which brought it into existence,
at least until they had consolidated their position. There was no time (and
there were precious few assets) to spare on programs for the welfare of the
soldiers or their families or on c ivi 1 -mi 1 i tary relations (in a positive
sense). The main thrust of the Soviet system was to ensure the loyalty and
effectiveness of the new Red Army, especially its leaders, and this was
accomp 1 i shed ma inly through har sh and nega t i ve measures— spy i ng , r epor ting,
routing out and "neutralizing" dissidents, harsh, didactic, persistent and
unequivocal political indoc t r inat ion
,
and perhaps most effective, a ruthless
system of t ak i ng hostages and reprisals. These measures were dictated by the
rule of necess i ty . The sys tern wh ich the Russ i an s introduced to China just a
few years after their civil strife ended was extremely refined compared with
the one they had inaugurated. And gradually the Soviet system evolved into
one which was much more comprehensive and sophisticated, employing the
totality of assets which became available to the political department of
90their armed forces.
The Chinese Connection
While these cataclysmic events were taking place to the north, the
Chinese, foil owing their rebe 1 1 ion agains t the Manchu Dynasty in 1911, were
having problems with "war lordi sm. " This semi -anarchical state of affairs,
wh ich we in the Wes t general ly regarded as traditional, had its roots in the
Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) when regional "armies" were recruited to put
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down the uprising. The Manchus never really regained control over these
armies and, when the last emperor abdicated in 1912, control of the new
"republican" government was taken over by YUan Shih-k'ai, former Manchu
premier who had the loyalty of the most powerful warlord army. The "heyday"
of this warlordism followed YUan's death in 1916 and lasted unt i 1 Chiang Kai-
shek established some semblance of order in 1928. 21
Meanwhile, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who had been trying unsuccessfully to
establish a truly republican form of government with many constitutional
re forms
,
was forced to flee into exile in Japan
. Foil owi ng Yllan Shih-k' ai ' s
death Sun moved back to China and settled in Canton where a government of
Southern China had been set up in opposition to the nominal Peking regime of
YUan and other northern warlords. Sun's efforts to gain support from this
"government" failed because his views were thought to be too democratic.
From 1918 to 1923 Dr. Sun shuttled four times between Canton and Shanghai;
eventually he was forced to flee Canton for Shanghai where, in January 1923,
he met Adolph Joffe, the Soviet envoy. This meeting was to change Chinese
O O
(and world) history.
Earlier, during its moment of greatest crisis Soviet Russia had made its
first friendly overture toward China: the Karakhan Declaration (after Leo
Karakhan, Deputy Foreign Corrmissar ) . The Declaration, which, though initi-
ated in July 1919 did not reach Peking until March 1920 due to the turmoi 1 i
n
Siberia, was received enthusiastically by the Chinese. This first concrete
expression of good will was followed by a second Soviet mission led by
Ignatius Your in, a member of the Central Siberian Soviet. 2 3 On 16 December
1921, Alexander Paikes, leading another Soviet mission, presented his
credentials in Peking. Paikes's mission, not enthusiastically received,
24
was followed by that of Joffe.
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Lenin was attracted by events in China. But more than that his hopes for
the spread of Corrmunism throughout the masses of western Europe had been
frustrated, in large part by the establishment of the Weimar Republic in
Germany; and the western allies were actively engaged in the counterrevolu-
tionary effort. At the same time Dr. Sun, who had been attempting, unsuc-
cessful ly, to get help from those same western powers, began to negotiate for
the employment of German ex-officers. It was then that the Soviets quickly
stepped in.
Although the Peking regime still was the official one in the view of
foreign powers, Joffe was not impressed and felt that Chinese unification
could best be achieved through Russian support of Sun Yat-sen. Though Sun,
like the Peking regime, had not been sympathetic to the Russian corrmunists,
certain factors impelled him toward a Soviet alliance: he was frustrated
with the Chinese revolution, disillusioned with the West, impressed by the
success of the Russ i an revolution, and impressed also by recent Soviet policy
toward China. On their part the Russ ians
,
apart from want ing to sow the seeds
of Corrmunism in China (peasants had now been included as "workers of the
world"), were concerned with the rise of Japan in the East and wished to
consolidate an alliance with China for geopolitical reasons.
The Kun Chang tang (KCT, Chinese Conmuni ty Party) came into existence in
Shanghai in 192125 and shortly afterward established an uneasy alliance or
"united front" with Dr. Sun's Koumintang (KMT, Chinese Nationalist Party)
against the Peking Government. Undoubtedly, Sun's acceptance of Soviet
cooperation had much to do with his agreement to form such an alliance.
In August 1923, Chiang Kai-shek, Sun's secretary and protege, was sent
to Moscow to intervi ew Lenin, Trotsky and St a 1 in and to study the organization
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of Russian Communism, especially the Red Army. In September, Mikhail
Grusenberg, later known as Michael Borodin, arrived at Canton with forty
Russian advisors to he lp establ i sh the Whampoa (or Whangpo) Military Academy.
As Henry Wei describes it:
Dr. Sun had entertained the notion of establishing
an academy for training officers for a revolution-
ary army. Now that Soviet cooperation was avail-
able, the project received prompt attention. The
result was the Whangpo Military Academy for
Officers. When Chiang Kai-shek returned from
Moscow in the spring of 1924, he was appointed
principal of the academy. Forty Russian experts
were employed as instructors and advisers. frnpha-
sis was laid not merely on military training but
also on political indoctrination. The object was
to create an army not only skilled in warfare but
fully conscious of the social and political signi-
ficance of the coming revo lut ion .
^
Whampoa Military Academy was opened on 1 May 1924, with an official
inauguration on 16 June by Dr. Sun. 27 Chiang Kai-shek, later to lead the
Chinese Nationalists, was the first conmander or "principal" of the School.
Chou En-lai, who was to become Mao's premier after the victorious communist
revolution, ran the political department of the Academy. Thus the seed of
polwar (Chiang and Chou are only two examples among many in both hierarchies)
were implanted early in both future Nationalist and Corrmun i s t leaders. Mao
Tse-tung at this time effectually ran the Propaganda Department of the
Kuomintang Central Executive Corrmi t tee . 28 Chiang, before leaving the
Academy to head the KMT upon Dr . Sun's death in 1925 , passed some 3 ,000 cadets ,
all politically indoctrinated, through the school.
In 1927, beginning with the "Shanghai Massacre" in April (see below),
the KMT launched a campaign of suppression of the CCP which culminated in the
rupture of the first United Front. The CCP movement shifted from the urban
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areas to the countryside and went "underground." This period marked the
beginning of the Chinese Red Army which, "was henceforth to be the bulwark of
the CCP in its struggle for survival and power (and) (v)irtually all CCP
members acqui red mi 1 i tary exper ience
,
whi le the Red Army itself was thorough-
ly penetrated by party organization and controls
.
"29 We must see what forms
this penetration took.
The regular communist forces had political personnel at all levels of
organization providing, in addition to political education and indoctrina-
tion, for the administration of soldiers' clubs and the issuance of training
manuals and newspapers. Rather than playing "watchdog" over non-carmuni s
t
officers (as in Russia) the political officers had an educative mission.
Their i nspi rat i on was Russian since Borodin and his advisors had provided the
initial guidance and impetus at Whampoa. But it was the activities and
purposes of the Chinese "polwar" officers which differed from those of the
Soviet commissars. Chalmers Johnson notes that "these political workers
were not exact ly analogous to the familiar political commissars of the Soviet
Army; the Chinese Communist political officers had both a different origin
and a different function. "30 Johnson cites F. F. Liu on the subject:
These (Chinese) commissars took up the task of
organizing the soldiers into party cel Is, educating
them politically, teaching them to read and write,
and acting as guardians and spokesmen for the
underprivi leged soldiers. . . . Thei r dut ies were
all part of their dual purpose of reforming the army
through bettering its morale and of strengthening
party loyalty. At the same time they won the
reputation of keeping the soldiers' welfare at
heart . 3
1
Apart f rom the troop instruction of the political of f icers--and the work
of the propaganda units, under whose officers programs were directed at the
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enemy (the Japanese or KMT, or both) and at local Chinese res idents—of prime
importance was the program of troop we 1 fare
,
a cornerstone of all subsequent
polwar systems patterned after the Chinese Corrmunist model. At the "grass
roots" level (company level) was the Soldiers' Club with a range of activities
geared to improve the welfare of the common soldier. Within the Club
Management Corrmittee were subcommittees such as:
(a) Hygiene Subcommittee : for car ryi ng out sani tat ion dut ies in the
company area.
(t>) Economic Subcommittee : for supervising the preparation of food
and the company's budgeting.
(c) Wall Newspaper Subcommittee : for compiling and posting wail
newspapers
.
(d) Culture and Recreation Subcommittee : for organizing reading
instruction, evening assemblies, self-criticism ("study") meet-
ings, etc.
(e) Physical Training Subcommittee : for leading off-duty sports.
Johnson, who provides this information, claims that although the Club
Management Committee was "guided" by the company political officer, the
committee itself was elected by popular vote. 32 Whatever the case, we see
here the beginning of the organizational attempt to improve the lot of the
rank and file, a sys t emat i zed attempt which was to grow in sophi s t icat i on and
efficiency in later polwar organizations.
While some systemof political control existed in the PLA from the time
that Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh joined to form the Fourth Red Army in Apr i 1 1928,
the cornerstone of its polwar organization was the Kutien Resolution, the
pub 1 i shed version of a speech given by Mao at Kut i en in December 1929.33 John
Gittings calls this "the locus classicus in the Maoist scriptures on this
question of party control over the army. "34 The Resolution has been
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republished in part or in its entirety on a number of occasions when the CCP
felt impelled to revitalize its central themes of "improving army solidarity
and discipline, establishing good relations with the civilian population,
and winning over the enemy. "35 Gittings writes:
The Kutien conference was held at a time when
condi t ions in the Red Army were still disorganized.
Its ranks included ex-warlord soldiers, peasant
militiaman, raw recruits, bandits, and fugitives
from justice. It was beset by lack of discipline,
' remnants of militarism’, with some officers mal-
treating or even beating their men, and 'vagabond-
age'
,
defined as ' a di s inc 1 inat ion to set t le down to
the serious tasks of government '
--probab ly a
euphemism for banditry. This desperate need to
hold the army together and prevent its deteriora-
tion into yet another bandit force gave flesh and
blood to the abstract principles of political
cont rol . 36
Consequently, Mao's speech dealt with "'erroneous conceptions' in the army,
party organization, party education, army propaganda, soldiers' political
training, special education of young soldiers, favorable treatment of
prisoners, and relations between mi 1 i tary and political authorities within
the army, "37 thus providing a fundamental model for modern polwar. He
emphasized the need for a political structure extending to the lowest level
(squad "cells") and providing political education for soldiers and polwar
cadres alike. As Gittings rightly says:
The Kutien Resolution is important not only
because it is the first extended treatment of the
question of political control and education by Mao
or any other Chinese corrmunist leader, but because
it sets the pattern for the approach to this ques-
tion throughout the army's subsequent history.
Political work was, and still is, regarded as a
totality which embraces all aspects of the army's
everyday life, of its cultural, educational, and
sparetime activities. It also dictates the way in
which relations between the army and the civilian
population, and within the army itself between
officers and men, are handled. 38
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Not the least of Mao's precepts was that of proper "relations between the
army and the civilian population," exemplified by the Three Cardinal Rules of
Discipline conceived just prior to the Kutien speech, probably jointly by Mao
and the Red Army's first corrmander, Chu Teh: 39
1. Obey all orders.
2. Take nothing from the peasants.
3. Pool all confiscated goods.
It was the landlords who were to be made to suffer, not the peasants whom they
had been grinding into the dust. Edgar O'Bal lance is instructive on Mao's
wisdom on this subject:
Mao Tse-tung, the far-seeing, peasant -minded
politician, evolved certain rules of conduct to be
observed toward the peasants. . . . The main rules
were that the peasants were to be treated with
cour tesy
,
nothing mus t be taken from them unless it
was first paid for, and anything borrowed must be
promptly returned. This was a novel and unusual
approach for Chinese soldiers to adopt. ... To
the Chinese mercenary soldier the Chinese peasant
was the lowest form of life, and this opinion was
reciprocated heart i ly by the peasants themselves . .
. . The two were chasms apart, and now Mao Tse-tung
was not only trying to bring them together but
eventually to integrate them. 4®
Mao's organization for political control of the armed forces was (and
remains) a two-tiered hierarchy: a party corrmittee, with no formal links to
the military authorities, which co-exists on every level with the military
structure but is i ndependent of it; and a political hierarchy integral to the
army (wi th counterparts today in the navy and air force) which is found at al 1
levels from the General Political Department at PLA Headquarters to the
regimental Political Office (see Chart 1 on the following page).
But what of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists?
On 9 July 1926, Chiang became the Corrmander- in-Chie f , or Generalissimo
(as he liked to be called), of the revolutionary army (KMT forces which still
Chart 1
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included the comnunist elements) and inmediately comnenced the Northern
Campaign, or Expedition, an effort to defeat the nor them war lords and unify
China. With the nucleus he had developed at the Whampoa Academy, both
Nationalist and comnunist, he had cleared and consolidated the South,
beginning with Canton and its environs. Whether Chiang had plans to
eliminate the comnunists from the outset of his northern drive is open to
debate
;
nonetheless
,
within less than a year he was bashing them wherever he
found them.
On 27 March 1927, Chiang' s troops sacked Nanking, destroying a great
deal of foreign-owned property. It has been al leged that this was done at the
inst igat ion of the conrnunist political officers who were at large in the city
( and still were integral to the KMT forces) in the hope of widening the breach
between Chiang and foreign governments .4 1 Understandably, the Western
powers already were less than pleased with Chiang' s arrangements with the
Soviets and their advisers. In any case Chiang knew that as long as he
col laborated with the comnunists
,
Russian or Chinese
,
he would get little of
the help he so desperately needed from the West.
On 12 April, Chiang's Nationalists, already occupying Shanghai,
attacked the corrmuni s ts there
,
killing some 5 ,000 in three days .42 The purge
cont inued wi th the removal of all persons suspected of comnunist sympathies
from positions of authority. Chiang then made a blunder which would prove to
have repercussions of seismic proport ions--he ordered the abolition of all
political officers in his armed forces. This was a mi stake--the rectifica-
tion of wh i ch ( as we shall see ) a quar ter -century later gave the Nat ional i s t s
internal security but came too late to affect the situation, ever, in mainland
China--a mistake which the "Generalissimo" undoubtedly regretted bitterly
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until, still unable to return "home" after yet another quarter-century, he
died in virtual exile on Taiwan. Not the least of what Chiang lost was the
systematized, propagandi s t ic appeal to the Chinese peasants for their
support, an appeal which Mao developed to perfection in his later campaigns
against the Japanese as well as the Nationalists.
After a bloody and seemingly successful campaign which lasted until the
early simmer of 1927 and left Mao and his followers, battered and bleeding
(but not out), sheltering in the Hankow area, Chiang felt strong enough to
break with the Russ i ans and consolidate his anti -corrmun i s t camp
. On 27 July
,
Borodin and Blucher (Galen)43 were expelled from China and their fellow
Russian advisers either went with them or were arrested. Predictably, as a
result of all this, Chiang did begin to receive some help in money and suppl ies
from foreign powers .
^
Thinking he had delived a decisive blow against the conmunists, Chiang
continued his campaign against the northern warlords. His optimism was
short-lived. By 1930, when he was receiving the first of his German
advisers
,
the Reds
,
es tabl i shed firmly in various parts of China with amain
base in the region bordering Kiangsi and Fukien provinces and operating in
small semi - i ndependent units, commenced their guerrilla operations. Under
rigid political control and guided by Mao ' s four "Golden Rules of Warfare,"*
they successfully survived the first four of Chiang's five "extermination"
* Although Mao, in time, became a master strategist these rules may have
originated with Chu Teh, the older strategist. In any case they are: When
the enemy advances--we retreat; . . . hal ts--we harass
;
. . .
avoids
bat 1 1 e--we attack; . . . retreats--we follow . 1 1 was when the Reds failed to
follow this guidance (as during the fifth extermination campaign) in the
earlier stages of the civil war that they suffered for it. See Edgar
O' Ba 1 lance ' s The Red Army of China
,
London
,
Faber & Faber
,
1962 pp. 47 & 67
.
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campaigns
;
and whi le doing so prospered by capturing a great deal of equipment
and thousands of Nationalist soldiers, turning most of the equipment and a
large number of the prisoners to their own purposes.
The fifth extermination campaign, begun in 1933 and orchestrated by the
German General Von Seeckt and involving nearly a million of Chiang’s men
(against about 200,000 Reds in the Kiangsi and Oyuwan Soviets) almost
succeeded. 45 After a campaign lasting twelve months, the Reds, hopelessly
encircled and forced more and more to fight in position defense (contra Mao's
Golden Rules), broke out in September 1934 and, marching some 6,000 - 8,000
mi les through twelve provinces over a year ' s time
,
escaped to northwest China
with the bulk of their forces. Although losses on the march generally were
severe, the corrmunists wasted no time in reconstituting their forces. Only
six months after his arrival in Szechuan, Hsu Hs i an-ch ' i en
,
commanding the
Red Fourth Front Army which left the Oyuwan area in 1934 with between 50,000
and 60,000 men, had increased that army's strength to more than 100,000.^
This great event, claimed as a victory by both sides, has been written
down indel ibly under the rubric "The Long Marches" ( of ten mi s taken 1 y ca 1 led
"The Long March"
;
there were three main bodies--the First, Second and Fourth
Front Armies--which left at different times and took different routes).
A1 though mi 1 i tary historians may claim that this was a partial victory for Von
Seeckt and the Nationalists, or a partial defeat for the corrmunists, no one
denies that this "great escape" led eventually, but decisively, to Chiang
Kai-shek's ultimate defeat. To the value of the sheer numbers who escaped
one must add the less tangible and less obvious but extremely important fact
that the enterprise provided a tremendous psychological boost to corrmunist
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solidarity. Itisa fact also that fol lowing their victorious civil war most
of the top members of party and government in Corrrnunist China under Mao had
participated, as did he, in The Long Marches.
According to Chalmers Johnson "(t)he role played by the Japanese Army in
bringing the Chinese Conmunists to power has never been fully appreciated by
foreign observers (but) resistance to Japan provided the corrmon ground on
which cooperation between Corrmunists and peasants was based. "47 Although
"foreign observers" may not have agreed at the time of Johnson's writing
(around 1960)
,
John Gittings did a few years later. Gittings cites the same
passage from Johnson and goes on to say that "Japanese hostilities against the
communist areas
. . . coupled with
continually identified communism as
increase the existing support for
the effect of their propaganda which
the main enemy in China, only served to
the Chinese corrmunists ."48 Chalmers
Johnson's elaboration is worthy of quotation at length,
Japan's invasion and occupation of China
decisively altered the political interests of the
peasantry. Prior to 1937, the peasants were a
passive element in politics .... The prewar
peasant was absorbed in local matters and had only
the dimmest sense of "China." Japan's invasion
changed this condi t ion by heightening the peasant ' s
interest in such concepts as national defense,
citizenship, treason, legitimacy of government,
and the long-range betterment of the Chinese state .
. . . Peasant mobilization in response to the
Japanese menace
,
combined with the Communist readi-
ness to lead the nationalistic upsurge in the
countryside, was the essential ingredient in the
wartime Communi s t -peasant alliance.
^
According to Edgar Snow, Franklin Houn tells us, Chou En-lai told him (Snow)
in 1936 that:
30
(A) 1 though the Communists wanted to end the
civil war and unite with the Koumintang to resist
Japan, they had no intention of abandoning the
revolution, but rather hoped to advance it, saying,
"The first day of the ant i
-Japanese war will mean
the beginning of the end for Chiang Kai-shek. 50
Following the Japanese invasion of China in July 1937, Chiang was
compelled to agree to form a second united front with the Reds. An agreement
was signed for a joint Communist-Nationalist war against Japan and the Red
Army was reorganized into the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies (but with
polwar organizations intact) under Chiang's nominal command. The "union"
lasted until 1940 when cooperation broke down following Chiang's attack on
the New Fourth Army, when he alleged that they had refused to obey his
orders. 51 Each side had cherished the hope that through engagement with the
Japanese the other side would be weakened . What Chiang finally realized was
that with the tremendous peasant support they were receiving in the
countryside the communists were growing much stronger, not weaker. As
O'Ballance puts it:
The Nationalist attack on the 4th Route Army
caused the final break in the thin veneer of the
United Front, and from January 1941 until 1945,
there was what amounted to an armed truce between
the Reds and the Nationalists. Each left the other
alone .... Chiang Kai-shek had decided upon a
policy of containing the Reds, hoping meanwhile
that the Japanese would destroy them. 2
As to the United Front per se
,
Townsend and Womack present a most up-to-date
opinion:
The real significance of the second United
Front was not, then, meaningful cooperation with
the KMT, which was never realized, but rather its
impact on the Communi st Revolut ion . . . . Superfi-
cially, the United Front appeared to suggest co-
operation between two parties, each representing a
different class base; in fact, the CCP used it to
establish itself as the leader of a truly national
movement . 53
31
After Pearl Harbor, Chiang relied on American aid. A state of armed
watchfulness existed between the Nationalists and conmunists until the end of
the war by which time the Reds claimed an army of nearly one million
.
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Despite mediation efforts by US representatives such as George Marshall and
Ambassador Hurley in 1945 (Marshall effected a shaky cease-fi re which lasted
from January until July 1946) the civi 1 war re-erupted and despite US aid the
Nationalists were defeated, first in Manchuria then throughout China. With
the inexorable disintegration of his armies, Chiang resigned as President in
January 1949, leaving his Vice President, Li Tsung-jen, in charge as acting
President until the absolute and bitter end in the Fall. Chiang fled to
Taiwan, but not without some thought for his future. Edgar O'Bal lance
describes how
Chiang Kai-shek saw defeat in sight and began
to prepare a safe refuge and retreat on the island of
Formosa, to which he moved the gold reserves, many
of his best troops, his air force and the bulk of the
modern American equipment that remained to him.
The U.S.A. was now distinctly cool towards him and
military aid had tailed off. Stripping the main-
land to fortify Formosa, he left Li, the acting
President, to hold out against the Reds as best he
could. 55
This showed perhaps more discretion than Hitler did a few year earlier under
somewhat similar circumstances.
On 1 October 1949 theestabl ishment of the People' s Republ ic of China was
announced and "the new year 1950 found the uncouth, unsophisticated (but
politically oriented), open-mouthed PLA, nearly 4 1/2 million strong,
ti 5 6panting and triumphant, gazing in wonder at its own achievements."
It is interesting to note that from 1945 to 1949, when the KMT was so
decisively defeated on the mainland, its polwar system had been completely
32
abandoned. Military and political defeat were to be the basic reasons for
the reinstitution of a rigid political military system on the island of
Taiwan. The need for a "carrier vehicle" to develop and sustain an
efficient, loya 1 mi 1 i tary force was obvious; the "vehicle" chosen was polwar.
The Latter Day Chinese Nationalist Polwar System
Faithful to the hoary Three People's Principles (San Min Chu I) of Sun
Yat-sen - nationalism, democracy and livelihood - Chiang Kai-shek reintro-
duced polwar to his armed forces (and ultimately, directly or indirectly, to
the entire populace of the Republic of China). The Chinese Nationalist
Political Staff Col lege was founded
,
along the same lines as its ancestor
,
the
Whampoa Academy, on 1 July 1951 and was given the mission
To train and qual i fy individuals to be politi-
cal warfare officers, to be faithful to Three-
people-principles, obedient to their national
leader, and loyal to their country in addition to
being rich in the sense of responsibility and honor
so that they may undertake the mission of Anti-
communist and Resist Russia which leads to national
revival . 57
Even taking into account the difficulty of transliteration to such an alien
language as English this Chinese passage is interesting in its use of
capitalization. Ironically, and somewhat ignominiously
,
the location
chosen for the college originally was a Japanese-built pre-World War Two
racetrack and the first "po lwar r ior s" began with only a ticket office and some
ramshackle stables
,
along wi th a few hundred cadets . Over the next ten years
there was significant improvement as shown by this statement from one of the
polwar staff officers at the school:
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The capacity of training has (been) raised to
more than three-thousand students, ten times the
number of trainees at the very inception of the
college. As to the construction, there are 183
buildings all over the campus which, in turn,
originated from several stables ... we have
converted the former deserted racetrack into the
existing splendid Fu Hsing Kang, the cradle of
political warfare workers. °
Fu Hsing Kang still produces polwar officers (and NCOs ) who though probably as
well-indoctrinated as their early predecessors are perhaps less optimistic
about returning to reposses the mainland and ultimately defeating Soviet
Russia.
The evolution of the ROC system from these early days into the complex
structure of today is a study of conceptual refinement whose basic impulse was
necessity; a necessity felt as a direct result of the Nationalist's defeat on
the mainland. Clearly cognizant of the fact that the ROC military forces
needed motivation, indoctrination and purpose if a cohesive combat (more
defensive than offensive in recent times) force was to be formed, the
Nationalist leadership developed, by the late 1950s, a comprehens ive organ-
ization whose mission was, and is, to make the ROC Armed Forces a more
effective instrument of national policy and to ensure a stable, reliable and
res pons ive body of troops. Fromthis objective flow many impl i ci t f unct ions
which include internal security, discipline, morale, sound civilian rela-
tions (one cannot help but recall Mao) and other allied areas.
Interestingly, the Chinese Nationalists insist upon dating their
present polwar system from the establishment of Whampoa Academy in 1924 when
the combined or "united front" revolutionary army was created under Russian
supervision. In addition to crediting the Russian corrmunists, now their
mortal foes second only to the mainland Chinese
,
recogni tion is given also to
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Confucius (attributable perhaps to the latent resentment felt toward the "new
cultural movement" of 191559 which rejected "Confucius and Sons" and many of
whose members
,
such as Mao Tse-tung
,
later espoused corrmuni sm)
,
the Germans
(Von Seeckt and company of the early 1930s), and even the United States (the
major provider of military and economic aid). A General Political Warfare
Department (GPWD) briefing of 1964 says it thusly:
It (the ROC Polwar System) has deep roots in
Confucianism. It was forged as a revolutionary
instrument under Russian guidance, was influenced
by subsequent German advisors, and has in the past
decade been in a state of evolution. This state of
evolution has been characterized by a responsive-
ness to United States philosophy and training out of
proportion to the understanding, advice and assis-
tance from the United States. 0
An interesting statement, especially in view of the fact that the United
States, though it supported polwar in both Nationalist China and South
Vietnam, never had an official "philosophy" about the subject, gave none of
the training, understood little about polwar per se and therefore could
pr ov i de little advice . Ass i stance
,
i n the forms of money and equipment
,
was
given in abundance.
The Nationalists go on to claim that it was polwar which enabled them to
defeat "numerical ly superior forces" (the warlords) as well as to "achieve a
brilliant record in such campaigns as . . . the Communist Suppression
operation and in the war against Japan. "6! They claim also that it was the
abolition of the system, caused by the Communists, "after World War II,"
which led to their downfall. The official position is stated thusly:
After World War II the Chinese Communists,
being aware of the influence of the political
warfare establishment within the Chinese Armed
Forces, did everything possible to undermine and
discredit our activities. The Chinese Communist
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activities led to the abolition of the political
warfare establishment in the Chinese Armed Forces.
Corrmunist agents were then able to corrupt theminds
of our troops
,
to incite the masses and to waver the
strong fighting will of our troops. Under the
circumstances, we were not able to fight the enemy
fist with fist and toe to toe. As a result of this
bitter lesson, President Chiang determined in 1950
to re-es tab 1 i sh the political warfare system in our
armed forces. 62
Not only is this statement reductive, it is ridiculous. The last sentence,
if taken out of context, is valid. Of course, to be fair, it can be cited as a
seminal example of the practice of polwar
. Whatever Chiang may have claimed,
it was his abolition of the position of political officers following the
"Nanking Incident" in 1 927 which caused hi s system to become
,
if not morbid,
dormant until its revival in 1950.
The stated mission of the ROC polwar organization is: "To make the
Armed Forces a more effective instrument for implementation of national
policies derived from the democratic principles (nationalism, democracy and
1 i ve 1 ihood) taught by Dr . Sun Yat-sen."63 From this mission statement seven
principles are derived, which are to:64
1. Instill in the minds of servicemen the
principles for which they fight.
2. Improve teamwork and unity within the armed
forces
.
3. Provide security against enemy subversion.
4. Improve leadership capabilities of unit
commanders
.
5. Nurture morale and welfare of the armed
forces and their dependents.
6. Supervise enforcement of discipline in the
armed forces.
7. Promote understanding and cooperation between
the armed forces and civilians.
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Taking the mission and objectives together say the Chinese, "a surmary
statement can perhaps be made that the General Political Warfare Department
is primari ly charged with providing the commander with a stable and respon-
sive body of troops which in turn provides the national government with a
stable and responsive instrument for pursuit of national pol icy. "65 We wi 1
1
be reminded of this quintessential statement in our discussion of the
Egyptian armed forces later in this thesis.
As to organization for polwar
,
only a brief, general description of the
ROC st ructure wi 1 1 be necessary since the next part of this thesis wi 1 1 deal in
detail with its country cousin," the South Vietnamese system.
The Republic of China General Political Warfare Department is a staff
organization directly under the Ministry of National Defense and is subject
to the supervision of the Chief of the General Staff (the equivalent of the
Cha i rman of the Joint Chi e fs of Staff in the Uni ted States) as shown i n Chart 2
on the following page. The staff and the unit organizations which execute
the ROC political warfare mission, at all leve 1 s of command
,
are not common to
Western military organizations. Whi le the ROC armed forces do have opera-
t ional staffs which closely paral lei those of the USmilitary structure, they
have also a staff system des igniated by the let ter "P" (P-1 through P-6 ) which
is responsible for both "external" missions, such as psychological warfare
activities and civil affairs matters, as well as with all of the multifaceted
environmental factors that affect the attitudes of the individual members of
the armed forces (see Chart 3 on page 38 and Appendices 1 and 2 ) . Also, under
the di rect Command of MND and the supervision of GPWD are sixteen support ing
or operational units responsible for polwar assignments (see Appendix 3).
Chart 2
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COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION OF ALL-LEVEL POLITICAL WARFARE UNITS
IN THE CHINESE ARMED FORCES
This chart shows how the political warfare establishment fits into the overall organiza-
tion of the Armed Forces. The General Political Warfare Department, one of the staff
organizations directly under the Ministry of National Defense and subject to the Chief of
the General Staff, at the MND level is the top level political warfare establishment. GPWD
is responsible for overall planning and supervision of political warfare activities at all levels.
A political warfare department, section, or officer is assigned to each command within the
Armed Forces.
Chart 3
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ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF
THE GENERAL POLITICAL WARFARE DEPARTMENT, MND
This chart sh;ws the organization of the General Political
Warfare Department. As
can be seen, the GPWD is composed of six operating elements, the Comptroller
Office,
and the Administrative Office in addition to the Military
Spokesman's Office and the
Political Warfare Planning Committee. Political
warfare establishments at all levels of the
Armed Forces follow this same organizational pattern.
* See Appendix 2
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As noted earlier, the association of the word "political" with the
military often creates a mental block (at best) in the Westerner
,
particu-
larly in the USmilitary advi ser (about whom mo re will be said later). With a
strong display of understandable, if not justifiable, ethnocentr i sm, the
corrmon reaction of the Westerner has been, and unfortunately continues to be,
to equate ROC and RVNAF (Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces) with the US Army
framework. Although this can be done to some extent (see Chart 4) what must
be kept in mind is the fact that the entire reason for the establishment of any
polwar system is to consolidate all the activities and personnel and even
equipment dedicated to the accomplishment of the polwar mission into a
homogeneous, possibly elite, if you will, organization of trained and
unquestionably loyal experts who are responsive to the direct supervision of
a chief who is directly under or perhaps even part of the national government.
Not the least benefit of having a direct chain to the very seat of government
i s the assurance of adequate and proper funding within the fiscal budget i ng of
the nation's military forces. This is not to say that the system, particu-
larly in "free world" countries, should be autonomous
;
the dangers of having
such a system are obvious; eventually the sponsoring government would find
itself "hoist on its own petard."
In addition to approaching what is largely an "Eastern" concept with a
"Western" viewpoint the spectre of "political corrmissar" immediately arises
and looms large
,
especial ly in the minds of Amer icans who have been bred in an
atmosphere of naive isolationism (although some twisted hope may lie in
governmental debacles such as Watergate and the Iran-contra affair). This
too i s under s tandab 1 e
,
espec i a 1 1 y in view of the Ch i nese Corrmuni s t adapt at ion
of the concept. But the Chinese Communists developed their polwar system
Chart 4
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Comparison Between Political Warfare Staffs and US General and Special
Staffs in Connection with Their Authorities and Responsibilities
Here on this chart the left column shows the responsible political warfare section, the
right column shows the responsible U.S. staff section, and the center column shows the
common funtions. As can be readily seen the political warfare staff funtions in the Chinese
Armed Forces and those in the U.S. general and special staffs are similar in nature. The
difference lies only in the name of the organization. The former is centralized in one
organization while the latter is handled separately by different staff offices.
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into a structure which supercedes the formal and traditional mi 1 i tary conmand
chain. Neither the ROC nor RVNAF systems placed the polwar officer over or
even equal to the cotrmander
. In this sense polwar is a supporting arm which
the corrmander
,
if he is prudent, can use to better accomplish hismission. It
is a fact that the Chinese "P" staff maintains a separate corrmuni cat ions
channel; however, the political officer is, in both theory and fact,
subordinated to the corrmander, at all levels. He is an "operator" in the
truest sense of the word, but only "for" the corrmander.
Unquestionably, Chiang Kai-shek learned a hard lesson. In fact
,
he is
reported to have once said that "the loss of the Mainland (China) is
attributable 70% to political factors and 30% to military factors and that it
can be regained only by concentration of effort in the same ratio. "66
Although Chiang' s percentages may be questionable the fervor with which he
established and then developed his General Political Warfare Department
reveals virtually an obsessive impulse to consolidate and ensure the future
loyalty of not only the members of his armed forces but of the civilian
populace living with him in his exile. His legacy continues. In fact, the
major objection to the GPWD (among many Westerners as well as a significant
number of the Taiwanese), that it is an instrument of the KMT, must be
recognized; but it must also be evaluated in the relation to the environment
within which the armed forces and the KMT (ROC) exist. Favorable points
which may be considered are the steady progress of both the ROC armed forces
and the civilian economy, in spite of the country's staggering defense
budget. Considering the present status of the ROC armed forces, its
re 1 at i onsh ip with the civilian corrmuni t y and the condi t ion of that corrmuni t y
itself, it is difficult not to credit the polwar concept to some extent.
CHAPTER II - REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES POLWAR
Introduct ion
As necessity promoted the development of the ROCpolwar concept, so also
was it the prime stimulant for South Vietnamese interest in the system. By
1960, communist pressure had reached a level which the Republic of Vietnam
found intolerable. The military forces of the Republic were, during this
period, trying to accomplish two difficult missions: fight the communists
and train leaders and units. Either of these tasks, particularly for a new
military establishment, would have been difficult. To accomplish both
simultaneously was inf ini tely more complex and frustrating. Recognising
the potential importance of the armed forces of the Republic as a stabilizing
formal institution in national affairs, the Diem government established a
political warfare school in Saigon. The philosophical underpinnings of the
school were derived from a uniquely Vietnamese brand of humanism which was
envisioned as a counter for communist ideology. This was not the "secular
humanism" of which one hears more and more today; rather than a "Western"
philosophy oriented exclusively toward man, it was, as developed by Diem's
brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu
,
an admixture of Christianity and patriotism, seasoned
with a liberal soupcon of Buddhism, Taoism and Confucian ethics.
The Political warfare School trained selected Republic of Vietnam Armed
Forces ( RVNAF ) psycho log i ca 1 warfare officers in indoc t r inat ion concepts and
techniques while inculcating the humanistic concepts of Nhu. 67 Beyond the
fact that the school had an adequate advisory staff from the Republ ic of China
there exists no information that indicates the students were really trained
for anything beyond conventional psychological warfare activities.
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November 1963 marked not only the end of the Di em government but also the
end of the first "formal" polwar effort in the Republic of Vietnam. The
polwar school continued to operate but without the support of senior
governmental officials, a situation which continued until May, 1964, when a
reconrmendat ion was made through RVNAF channe 1 s to develop a system within the
armed forces similar to that which existed in the Republic of China. This
recommendation was endorsed by both the RVN Minister of Defense and Paul
Harkins, Commander
,
US Military Advisory Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV)
,
and
later, upon his replacing Harkins, by General Westmoreland.
Following a senior level liaison visit by RVN and US officials to the
Repub 1 ic of China speci f ic recorrmendat ions were made and later actual i zed by
the es tabl i shment of the RVNAF General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) in
November
,
1964 . Interestingly, this was not an isolated action, but rather
was a part of a broad reorganization within the RVNAF. Finalization and
implementation were realized by General Executive Decree 152-QP on 24 July
1965.68 This instrument established the General Political Warfare Depart-
ment as an integral part of the RVNAF at Joint General Staff level.
The mission statement of GPWD was to study, prepare, and implement
polwar plans within the RVNAF relating to: strategic, organizational,
ideological, psychological, intelligence, and the peopl e ' s war fare . 69 The
fact that these six approaches are almost identical with Chiang Kai-shek's
"Six Great Warfares," leads to the prompt conclusion that the ROC method was
integrated into the RVNAF in toto. In fact, such was not the case; those
elements which were considered to be compatible with South Vietnam's
requirements were adopted, those that were not were discarded. The essence
of RVN Polwar was uniquely Vietnamese, though, as I mentioned earlier, the
organization and staff structure were remarkably similar to the ROC system.
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The RVNAF polwar system was an organizational attempt to solve basic
problems such as ensuring loyalty to the constituted government and improving
civil-military relations. The specific functional areas of responsibility
assigned to the GPWD included: troop indoctrination and mot ivat ion
,
troop
and dependant welfare, civil affairs, psychological warfare, and security.
In priority order, the GPWD was concerned wi th RVNAF personnel, civilians in
hostile and friendly areas, and enemy troops. Simply stated the polwar
mission was to create and maintain the loyalty of the RVNAF to its leaders,
nation and national ideology
,
to gain and maintain the support of the civi 1 ian
population in both friendly and enemy controlled areas, and to destroy the
loyalty of enemy troops to their leaders, nation and national ideology. In
sun, the long range goal was to achieve a cohesiveness among the various
ethnic, linguistic, religious and ideological (political) groups in all of
Vietnam in order to bring about national unity. Rather ambitious a task,
under the circumstances! One cannot help but think of the crude metaphor
about being sent to drain a swamp which is full of very active alligators.
As in psychological opera t ions
,
and especial ly i ts favored instrument
,
propaganda, the polwar effort concentrates on people's attitudes, on trying
to induce certain behavior through influencing individual attitudes. This
was the ultimate objective for all polwar efforts in Vietnam. However, this
first requires close analysis of the individual and his values, desires and
needs (real and perceived) and beliefs; a difficult task under the best of
conditions. To achieve an understanding of individuals an assessment and
analysis must be made of the groups to which these individuals belong. The
research tools to accomplish this were available and to some degree were put
to use.
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Psychological operations officers in the US and in the RVN--mainly
inadequate for the task but the best the US could offer as far as any
orientation or understanding of polwar went-in conjunction with US scholars
in the fields of politics, psychology, sociology, economics and other related
disciplines were put to work. The former were to learn about polwar, the
latter to conduct studies in their fields in order to assist the GPWD in their
herculean task. But already it was too late. Probably several years would
have been required to plan and execute a successful sys tem--several years
during peacetime, not war. Instituting the system and fighting the war
simultaneously was impossible. The US advisers (combat arms advisers, not
polwar) attached to the ARVN (the bulk of the RVNAF was its army) were neither
t r a i ned nor suited for polwar oper a t ions. In any case
,
when one i s faced with
continuing combat operations one hardly has time for anything else, especial-
ly some esoter ic "new" idea for winning the war
,
an idea which seems to offer
no irrmediate positive effect on the outcome of the fighting.
Added to all this was the fact that the central government itself was
corrupt, thanks in no small part to the inattention (or worse) of US
representatives at the highest level of the advisory effort. Finally,
unlike corrmuni sm, there was no hard ideological product to "sell" by the South
Vietnamese political officers. As ment ioned above
,
among the first priority
items in the three-fold polwar mission was the need to create and maintain
loyalty to a "national ideology." Unlike their communist counterparts in
the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army (who had polwar systems taken from
the Chinese communist model as early as 1938), the RVNAF "polwarr iors" could
only say in a negative sense that communism was not good for the Vietnamese.
The only alternative, in a positive sense, was some form of democracy , based
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probably on the American model which was thousands of H_ (about one-third of a
mile) away from anything the average Vietnamese understood. The Americans,
meanwhile, could only say that for their part they wanted to help the
Vietnamese establish "some sort of climate of freedom" wherein the Vietnamese
people could, through some process of "self-determination," decide how they
wanted to be governed. To the corrmunists the answer was pre-packaged and
very s impl e--conmun i sm was the answer.
Despite its unfortunate fate the RVNAF polwar sys tan is worth examining.
Based upon its previous success historically polwar may have had a chance of
succeeding in Vietnam had the circumstances in which it was attempted been
otherwise. Before looking at its organizat ion and functions, however, its
three-fold mission is worthy of closer examination.
The Mission
Within the first part of the RVNAF' s three- fold mi ss ion--to create and
maintain the loyalty of the RVNAF to its leaders, nation and national
ideology- -the re were a series of intermediate objectives. The first of
these was to create the conditions under which a soldier can be expected to be
1 oya 1 . If the soldier is concerned about his food
,
pay or living condi t i ons
,
is worried about his family or feels that he is not being treated fairly,
i ndoc t r i na t i on and mot i va t i on programs cannot succeed . Thus
,
a s i nee re and
apparent concern for the well-being of the soldier must be developed and
augmented with programs of troop and dependent welfare, entertainment, and
recreation. Programs first must be initiated to develop a reasonably
contented, healthy soldier, making every possible aspect of his life better.
Once this condition is achieved he should be receptive to the second step--
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motivation and indoctrination. It after completing these steps the soldier
still was not loyal to the government of the RVN the third step--detection and
"neutral izaion" or "removal" of the soldier to prevent him from "contaminat-
ing" other soldiers was to be taken. Detection and neutral ization were to
be accomplished by the Military Security Police, an integral part of the
GPWD.70
Within this process two approaches are envisioned: the group or
indirect approach, and the individual or direct one. The first involves all
"impersonal" means of influencing the attitudes of soldiers, including uni t-
wide or army-wide information and recreation activities, and materials
designed to improve the soldiers’ morale. Examples are: dependent we 1 fare
programs, lectures, movies, radio and televisional magazines and news-
papers, and sports and entertainment programs. The second approach involves
various means of personal contact with the individual soldier. It is a
refined system involving investigation, counselling and persuasion and is
implemented by the polwar organization within the units. More will be said
about the techniques of this system later. For the moment it is enough to say
that this personal approach is one of the characteristics of polwar which set
it apart as a unique system.
The second part of the polwar mission --to gain and maintain the support
of the civilian popul ace --had three intermediate ob jec t i ves wh ich
,
to be mo s t
effective
,
had to be implemented sequential ly. The first was to identi fy the
pro-government elements, usually a small minority, within the targeted
civilian group. Once identified, these elements were organized and their
loyalty certified. To accomplish the next objective these organized pro-
government elements were used to solicit support of the uncorrmitted or
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apathetic segment of the population, usually the majority of the civilian
target group. Psychological warfare media and civic action projects were
used also to accomplish this objective. When there was enough evidence that
the majority of the populace is behind the government (effects analyses are
the most difficult part of all polwar
,
psyop, psywar operations, but the
outcome of RVNAF polwar makes this analysis necessarily theoretical), this
majority was to be used to identify and expel or "neutralize" the non-loyal or
pro-enemy elements which, assuning that the first two steps were successful
,
would now be a small minority. In Vietnam this final mission phase was
carried out primarily through the Revolutionary Development and Phoenix
programs; 72 the RVNAF, however, was to devote considerable attention to
gaining the support of the civilian populace for the national government.
The third part of the polwar mission was to break down the loyalty of the
enemy soldier to hi s leaders and cause him to desert and perhaps even rally to
the RVN cause. This effort which was to have been accomplished mainly
through the use of psywar in support of military operations, also had three
sequential phases: to identify and neutralize the enemy's cause; to divide
and destroy the enemy; and to organize and re-indoctr inate enemy returnees or
defectors
.
The Organization
The South Vietnamese system, though it failed along with the rest of the
country ' s armed forces was, as we shall see, extremely ambi t ious and broad in
concept and organization, and there are those who feel that it was the
fundamental error of trying to superimpose such an advanced and sophisticated
sys tern on an armed force that was al ready fighting for its very lifewhich made
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any success impossible and actual ly may have hastened the corrmunist victory.
A "cruder" approach under such dire circumstances may have proven more
effective, as in the example of Russia. In defense of the effort itself it
must be said that some systemat ization wi thin the South Vietnamese forces was
essential as even the kindest appraisals of corruption, desertion, maltreat-
ment of enlisted personnel and all other soldierly ills reveal. 73 in any
case it is my opinion that the Vietnamese system "fell under its own weight"
(aided greatly in that fall by the lack of understanding of the As i an mind and
lack of interest in anything political manifested by the great majority of
.American commanders of high rank)
. This is not to say that givenmore serene
ci rcumstances the Vietnamese could not have worked out a viable system. As I
have said (and wi 1 1 say again later in this work)
,
such a system, if emplaced
properly at the right time could be the salvation of a legitimately
established government trying to survive in a "developing" nation.
The General Political Warfare Department was a major subdivi s ion of the
RVNAF Joint General Staff
,
and was a joint services organization headed by an
army major general whose staff, based again upon the preponderance of army
forces within the RVNAF
,
cons i s ted almost entirely of army personnel . As in
the Republ ic of China
,
there were two main types of polwar cadre : those under
the direct command of the GPWD and those located in regular service units
(again
,
mainly army)
,
schools, training centers
,
or support organizations.
These latter were under the command of the officer commanding the unit to
which they were ass igned . Political warfare was a service branch and as such
had equal status with the other branches such as infantry, artillery and so
forth, at least theoretically, and its officers manned the GPWD and its
subordinate organizations as well as the polwar staffs of the schools,
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training centers, support orgainzat ions and regular mi 1 i tary "line" units at
regimental level and higher. In strict accordance with the integrated or
unified system, the polwar officers at company and battalion level were
considered members of the branch of that particular element (infantry,
artillery, etc.) to which they were assigned. Their polwar duties were
considered secondary to the primary operational mi 1 i tary mi ss ion
.
The main division of the GPWD organization follows the division of its
cadre into two parts: the GPWD and its subordinate organizations, and the
polwar organization within other military units or agencies. We will
consider them in that order.
The General Political Warfare Department
The Gene r al Political Wa r f a r e Depar tmen t ( Char t 5 on the foil owi ng page
)
consisted of its chief, three deputies, its staff and departments, a polwar
college and several operational units.
Whi le the deputy Chief for Troops Action was responsible for developing
long range programs for t roopmot ivat ion and indoctrination, the Deputy Chief
for Civic Action and Enemy Action was responsible for developing long-range
civic act ion and psywar programs
;
the Deputy Chief for RF/PF was responsible
for polwar activities within the regional and popular forces ( South Vietnam'
s
militia; the regional forces were equivalent to fairly well trained US
National Guard troops, the popular forces were mainly local irregulars).
These special staff members reported directly to the Chief, GPWD.
Chart 5
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The regular staff included: an Organizat ion Branch, which was respons-
ible for preparing tables of organization and equipment, training and the
polwar organization generally; a Plans Branch, responsible for preparing
long range polwar and psychological warfare plans; an Inspection Branch which
monitored the activities of the entire GPWD organization for indications of
misuse of office, corruption, or negligence of duties; an Information and
Public Relations Branch mainly responsible for the release of military
information to the civilian news media; a Sports and Gymnastic Branch which
administered unit sports programs and managed military teams which entered
international competitions; a Budget Branch; and an Administration Branch
which managed the routine administration of the GPWD.
The GPWD departments were those of Political Indoctrination and Train-
ing, Psywar, Military Security, Social Service, and Chaplains (as three
separate Directorates: Catholic, Buddhist and Protestant). The Polwar
College made up the final "department" or element within the GPWD staff
structure.
The operational or field elements of the GPWD included five polwar
battalions and attendant mass comnuni cat ions media. The mass corrmunica-
tions media, including radio, television, printing, motion picture, and
cultural activities, were under the operational control of the Psywar
Department
.
The Political Indoctrination and Training Department of GPWD had the
three-fold mission of: preparing plans which developed political
education, promoting high ideals, and building the morale of military
personnel; preparing political indoctrination training programs; and
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enhancing troop moraie through eamand and leadership activities aimed at
fostering enthusiasm, discipline, unity, an opt imi st ic at t i tude and a wi 1 1 to
fight
.
The concept of political indoctrination grew out of the need for a
standard ideology which would not change with each change of government. The
ideology stressed the three principles of eountrv jH 01 c y
,
honor and res pons ibi 1 i ty
(as in the "duty, honor, country" of the US Military Academy at West Point).
The soldier was taught that his country had a glorious history with brave
heroes who fought against overwhelming odds, and since his country had such a
past the soldier had a responsibility to fight for it and protect it from any
present danger. He was taught to believe it was an honor for him to be a
citizen of his country during its struggle for an independent democracy. He
was told for whom and what he was fighting and why he could be confident of
final victory. He was taught that he was fighting for his country and not a
religion, political party, individual leader or group of leaders. To
alleviate his traditional fear of evil rulers, he was taught how the
government operates. He was taught also that respect for private citizens
will build stronger ties of loyalty between the citizenry and soldiery.
Indoctrination involved the study of printed materials and discussions
to ensure a thorough understanding of the subjects. Radio, television,
motion pictures, poetry, plays, music, visits to historic sites (unless
occupied by hostile forces) and competitive events were used to supplement
the program. Political education was concerned wi th ideological guidance,
to include theories of revolution, explanation of national policies,
ana lyses of current events and criticism of hostile ideologies (in the case of
the RVN, communism).
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The Political Indoctrination and Training Department was organized into
five branches--Plans, Political Education, Uni t Act ivi t ies
, Administration,
and Motivation Indoctrination Program--and also had operational control of
the Polwar Training Center in Saigon (see Chart 6 on the fol lowing page)
. The
Training Center in Saigon trained those officers already on active duty whose
duties required polwar knowledge. Established in May, 1967, the center
offered two courses of instruction: The Polwar Staff Officer Course and the
Deputy Company Commander -Polwar Officer Course (to fill requirements for the
unified system at lower echelons). Each course was of five weeks duration
but effectually equivalent to eight weeks of training due to the hours
allotted each week
. I n March
,
1969, the t imes (hours) allotted for each
course were doubled. The polwar cadets at the College at Dalat would enter
active service after their studies were completed, having chosen polwar as
their career field. Upon graduation these newly corrmi ss ioned officers had
co-equal status ad rank wi th graduates of the RVNAF Mi 1 i tary Academy which was
co-located at Dalat. A1 though they were given some instruction in polwar and
were politically indoctrinated and educated to a degree, these latter
officers entered the traditional military branches of service.
The Psychological Warfare Department engaged in activities contribut-
ing to the accomplishment of all three GPWD mi ss ions . Most of the Depart-
ment's effort was, however, directed toward the first target audience, the
RVNAF, to include the regional and popular forces. Secondary targets were
the civilian populace and the enemy. The primary objectives of this
department were to develop broad thematic approaches, plans and doctrine for
POLITICAL
INDOCTRINATION
AND
TRAINING
DEPARTMENT
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national psywar and civic action programs, to supervise the implementation of
these programs, and to provide the corrmuni cat ions media support for the
accomplishment of developed programs.
The thematic approaches used in the late 1960s in Vietnam were based upon
the national objectives enumerated by President Thieu in his inaugural
address of January, 1967.74 At that time he announced broad objectives for
the next four years and the basic themes which he hoped would contribute to
their accompl i shment--peace
,
democracy and social reform. The Psywar
Department adapted these themes to different approaches to each target
audience and these basic thematic approaches provided the broad guidance
wi thin which all psywar messages were developed, with the possible exception
of some tactical psywar activities which called for the irrmediate exploita-
tion of local situations.
The Psywar Department
,
an integral part of GPWD, includes four divisions
and a coordination center, as shown in Chart 7 on the following page.
The Social Service Department was created for and charged with the
mission of providing social welfare support to all military and civilian
personnel within the Ministry of Defense and their dependents. In this role
the Department was responsible for the staff supervision and support of the
Social Sections in all military units, organizations, hospitals, schools and
training centers in the RVNAF. The key element in the Department was the
Welfare Division; this division conducted social operations while the
other s--Admini s t rat ion and Finance, Plans and Inspection, and the Social
Service Training School --played supporting roles (see Chart 8 ) . The entire
headquarters existed solely to support the field units, staffed by women
trained at the Social Service Training School. There were ten types of
Chart 7
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Social Service Sections ranging from a social service office of twenty-five
to a team of two. Social Service Assistants were stationed in each dependent
housing area and in each headquarters down to regimental and provincial
leve 1
.
Social Service Assistants cared for the soldier's family while he was
away from home. If he was killed, or hospitalized, his family could look to
the Social Service Assistant for help. Obviously, a soldier will fight more
effectively knowing that his government cares what happens to his family.
The welfare support mission was carried out through six main programs:
assistance in kind, assistance in cash, education, medical and maternity
care, youth activities, and self-help programs.
The distribution of "morale and welfare packets" was the most corrmon
activity associated with the assistance in kind program (see Chart 9 for the
packets' composition and intended beneficiaries)
. Of interest was the fact
that while some provision was made for the fami lies of ki 1 led or hospi tal ized
servicemen none was made for those of captured personnel. The desertion
statistics for the ARVN were staggering during the war
,
especial ly toward its
end, and while it was true that many soldiers deserted out of fear,
frustration or plain "homesickness" and many others went home to help with
harvests or when a fami ly crisis arose ( such as childbirth, spousa 1 inf ide 1 -
i ty or death in the irrmediate fami ly)
,
many RVN soldiers simply went over to
the other side. Also knowing that there was no compensation for prisoner of
war status probably was seen by RVN leaders as an incentive to ARVN soldiers to
resist capture.
Of the two types of cash assistance the first covered hardships in the
fami ly such as birth of a child, death of a family member , natural disasters
and cases of special hardship not covered by the categories above; the second
Chart 9
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SOCIAL SERVICE DEPARTMENT
"MORALE AND WELFARE PACKETS"
1. Packet for KIA's. Each family of a KIA is entitled to 5 meters of white
cloth. This is used in the traditional funeral ceremony.
2. Packets for hospitalized servicemen. Each serviceman, hospitalized because
of wounds or injuries, is entitled to:
2 cans of milk
2 pkg of cigarettes
1 towel
1 pr of shower sandals
1 pkg of toothpaste
1 tooth brush
1 bar of soap
3. Packets for new bom babies. Each new bora baby will receive:
5 cans of milk
5 meters of cloth
1 towel
1 bar of soap
1 bottle of Tiger Balm
4. Packets for servicemen in isolated posts. One packet is provide each
month:
1 towel
1 bar of soap
1 pkg of toothpaste
1 tooth brush
1 pr of shower sandals
4 pkg of cigarettes
5. Packets for families that are victims of natural disasters (families that
are victims of war damage will be taken care of on an individual basis). Each
family will receive:
5 meters of cloth
1 mosquito net
1 blanket
1 sauce pan
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type of payment was an indemnification payment for survivors of servicemen
killed in action or those wounded and in hospital. 75
As of August, 1969, the Social Service Department supported 121
kindergartens, 169 elementary schools and seven secondary schools in South
Vietnam, supplying, equipping and maintaining the schools and paying the
teachers' salaries. Local cormianders were responsible for the construction
of the schools. The students of the schools operated by the Department had
higher average scores in national testing than did the students of the public
schools . 76
The Department sponsored fifty-eight dispensaries, twenty medical
stat ions and thirty-eight maternity clinics throughout the country. During
the first half of 1969 over 30,000 dependents were treated or cared for in
these faci 1 i t ies . ^
The realization of its responsibility to provide activities for the
young dependents of the servicemen came late to the Social Services Depart-
ment, too late for any serious implementation of plans to provide all
dependent housing areas with such activities as Boy and Girl Scout organiza-
tions and other youth activities. In any case the benefits of such programs
is doubtful in view of the desperate situation both militarily and socially
and the almost inescapable probability that such plans were inspired by a
well-meaning but woefully misinformed American official.
The Chaplain Directorates provided for the spiritual welfare of the
service members and their dependents, widows and orphans. They also
provided educational facilities (in addition to those of the Social Services
Department ) by organizing, bui lding and operat ing schools for the dependents
of military personnel and providing social welfare services for military
personnel and their dependents, widows and orphans.
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The Directorates were three separate, autonomous entities responsible
directly to the Chief, GPWD. Each Directorate had its own organic logistical
and administrative support. They included chaplains down through regimen-
tal level in tactical units and through provincial level on an area basis.
The Protestant Directorate, with a limited constituency, had chaplains only
at corps and division level.
The chaplains performed the rites, ceremonies and religious instruc-
tional duties required by each particular faith. In support of these
activities each directorate pub 1 i shed a magaz i ne (in coord i nat ion wi th the
Psywar Department) financed from appropriated (governmental) funds.
In the field of educa t ion, the directorates were dependent entirely upon
their own resources to organize, build and operate schools. The government
provided only the land. In the area of welfare services all the directorates
were greatly dependent upon gifts of money and assistance in kind from
American and other "free world" sources. The care of refugees, widows and
orphans had the highest priority in their welfare activities. The
inadequate resources of the Social Service Department could not prevent
extreme hardship in virtually every case of a soldier's death
;
the role of the
chaplains thus became a crucial one.
The Political Warfare College
,
located in the mountain resort area of
Dalat, about 130 miles northeast of Saigon, was the successor to a psywar
school in Saigon (when the only aspect of polwar in which the US advisors had
any expertise was psychological operations, which includes psywar). In
1965, it was renamed the Political Warfare School (Nationalist Chinese
advisors were already on the scene) and in 1966 was moved to Dalat. Later
,
its name was again changed, this time to the Political Warfare College.
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Eventually this "college" was to become the center of all political warfare
training, but by the end of the war it still was concentrating on producing
company level polwar officers. Nonetheless, the mission statement called
for providing a college level educational program to produce active duty
(regular) RVNAF political officers, political warfare branch training for
existing RVNAF officers, and for organizing and directing political warfare
specialist training as required. Although its organizational chart is
extremely impressive (see Chart 10 on the following page) it was not self-
sufficient in either the number of instructors or development of its
program(s) of instruction. Routinely, civilian professors and other
advisors were flown from Saigon to Dalat to present lectures or chair
conferences. The Polwar Col lege, considered the key to the future success of
the entire polwar effort in South Vietnam,* expanded rapidly, and RVN
officials in the late 1960s projected that by 1975 the college would be an
accredited educational institution on par with many civilian universities.
Ironically, the year projected for this accompl i shment was that in which the
ccnmunists became unconditionally victorious. A polwar system operates
successfully in Vietnam today, but it is the descendant of the Corrmunist
Chinese system which was adopted by the Viet Minh in 1938.
The mission of each of the Political Warfare Battal ions was to provide
support to the RVNAF for troop education, motivation and indoctrination,
civic action, and psywar support of tactical operations. Of the five
battalions in Vietnam one was assigned to each of the four Corps Tactical
* Probably, this was an enemy consideration as well; on 1 April 1970, the
college was attacked by a force of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army
troops, who inflicted heavy damage and casualties.
[I
COMMANDANT
ADVISORY
GROUP
I
—
\
DEPUTY
Chart 10
64
o
PH
s O
p3
o
Eh S2
<o w COoo
<
—
1
L CO C/)
o —
§ so PH0H § PHEh
O0
2
sl hH PH PH w
1
£H> o cr. CO PHa O < E>-l CO HH PH 1/3
z 1
c p.O P3 oc2 -3 £ >M g i
—1
t>
-<
K 1 <Q O-Su < oOh o ic a PH £
« g < PI -3
& &Q
gfe
o f? Q J DO XS to
ph rc
< o 03 O
< DO
SR B p- i til ph Ph Eh
t-t 03 C z z
< ,~H, 00 »-H < 03
g & E-< o c03 ;* 3
« -3 Eh h4 Z
PH o o“
Ph Ph
>
i-t
«
to
6
ph
•8
<c
Eh
Eh 55 Z Eh2H 02 F5Ww2
PtH
phO W fcH
«PH
ES -<coQ3M eg
E3>
PhH CO
« o«
MESS
HALL
ORGANIZATION
OF
THE
POLITICAL
WARFARE
COLLEGE
65
Zones and under the operational control of the zone corrmander whi le the fifth
polwar battalion was in general reserve in the Capital Military District
(Saigon). The GPWD exercised close staff supervision over all the
battalions. In addition to their other responsibilities the battal ions were
responsible for the collection of polwar intelligence in their respective
areas of operation. The polwar battal ions were composed of a battal ion head-
quarters, an administration and technical company, a cultural platoon, and
four political warfare companies (see Chart 11). Their activities were
oriented toward three familiar target audiences: the RVNAF itself, the
civilian populace, and the enemy.
Activity aimed at the ARVN soldier and his dependents was primarily in
the form of info rma tion and entertai nmen t. Skits andpl ays we re presented by
the cultural platoon, and movi es were shown regul ar ly . In addi t ion
,
po lwar
units distributed magazines, newspapers, stamps and envelopes to the
soldiers and provided medical treatment to their dependents ( in coordination
with the Social Services Department and other medical units). In recruiting
centers battalion personnel conducted question and answer sessions with
t rainees
.
Polwar directed at the civilian populace in contested areas received
great emphasis. The delivery of the "government message" to civilians was
conducted by sma 11, semi -autonomous psywar-c ivic action teams which di s t r i -
buted magazines
,
newspapers and leaflets, printed and pictorial posters and
banners, showed movies and broadcasted with mobile loudspeakers. Medical
aid was popular with the people as was cultural group entertainment in the
form of singing and dancing, plays, etc. The most effective means of
Chart 11
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CULTURAL PLATOON
(POLWAR BATTALION)
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reaching the civilian populace, however, was face-to-face corrmunication.
Personal visits and conversations were held as much as possible, down to the
village and hamlet level.
Polwar activities aimed at the enemy were implemented by leaflet
dissemination, loudspeaker messages, and the production and distribution of
government posters, banners and slogans. Visits to and entertainment of
"returnees" (enemy defectors)
,
their families, or both, were provided also,
to a lesser extent, whenever possible. Enemy oriented operations usually
took place in a situation where an ARVN unit was in direct contact with the
enemy
,
especial ly in cases where the enemy was surrounded. The psywar-civi 1
affairs teams had the capabi 1 i ty for the limited production of quick reaction
leaflets which could be used to exploit surrender appeal situations during
psywar support of infantry operations.
The administration and technical company operated the battal ion finance
section, the motor pool, a printing and drafting section and a signal and
photo section. The cultural platoon, as shown in Chart 11, was composed of
f ive teams : wh i le the theater team per formed skits and plays
,
the music team
provided supporting and background music; the classical music team provided
its specialty, and the singing and dancing team performed to traditional and
modern music. The smallest element is the technical team which provided
sound and lighting specialists who ensured the proper acoustical and
background settings for all performances.
The four polwar Companies were identically organized with a company
headquarters, a polwar intelligence team, a political indoctrination
platoon, and two psywar-civil affairs teams (see Chart 12). The intelli-
gence team provided po lwar intelligence for company and bat tal ion use . The
Chart 12
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political indoctrination platoon contained a political education team, a
unit activities team, and a cultural welfare service team. The political
education team presented routine t roop educat ion programs
. The unit activi-
ties team was responsible for improving morale, strengthening loyalty to the
central government and improving the troops’ solidarity by organizing
various unit activities such as collective birthday parties, debate competi-
tions and songfests. The cultural welfare service team provided each
company with the basic troop entertainment tools, specializing in cultural
propaganda, sport contests and teaching hobbies. Soldier musicians and
dancers and civilian females organized group singing and dancing and
performed small dramas and skits.
The eight psywar-civil affairs teams of each company were composed of
e i gh t men each (see Char t 12). The team 1 eader
,
an officer, was a qualified
photographer; his NCO assistant was a draughtsman for posters and banners.
Two enlisted men were sound special i s ts and projector operators
. An enl i s t-
ed mimeograph operator, public health NCO, agriculture-supply specialist
(NCO), and an NCO who specialized in engineering completed the team.
Finally, the Military Security Department --which was provided US
advisors not from the US Polwar Advisory Group but directly from the office of
the Ass i stance Chief of Staff, J-2, US Military Assistance Corrmand
,
Vietnam,
and about whose specific activities little or nothing has ever been
pub 1 i shed- -was assigned the following missions: ensuring the security of
classified i n forma t ion and military activities; conduct ing counterespionage
operations; performing counterintelligence missions; conducting security
investigations of RVNAF personnel; and researching and studying documents
relating to enemy plans, operations, organization, intelligence and base
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areas. It is enough to say that while the other elements are all fundamental
to the success of any polwar organization, without an effective security
department there could be no hope of even initiating such an organization.
Political Warfare in Military Units and Organizations
The overall mission of polwar staffs "outside" the GPWD, in military
units and organizations, was the same as that of GPWD, with responsibility for
achieving the same intermediate objectives. The general scope of activity
was the same; however, the activities were adapted to the level of the unit or
organization. Every military unit or organization in the RVN had a polwar
element. The highest level operating military organization was the Corps
(Tactical Zone) and each corps contained a complete polwar staff. Each
division, regiment and battalion also had a polwar staff (see Charts 13, 14
and 15 for examples of staffs at various levels).
The polwar staff at all levels supported the conmander by keeping him
informed of the state of morale and discipline within his unit as well as on
the state of civi 1 -mi 1 i tary relations in his area of operations. The staff
prepared the polwar annex to all unit operations plans; this annex included
plans for psywar and civic action activities as well as the information
mentioned above relating to the troops and civilians in the area. Addi-
tionally, the polwar officers prepared and implemented plans (subject to the
conmander 1 s approval) for the improvement of the unit's troop and dependent
welfare, for mot i vat ion- indoct r inat ion-educat ion programs and other moral
and esprit de corps-building activities, and for counterintelligence
Chart 13
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activities. Final ly, the staff planned and implemented psywar and counter-
propaganda operations and activities in support of national campaigns and in
consonance with the immediate tactical situation.
The polwar staffs in support units and other non-combat organizations
were responsible for planning and implementing polwar activities within
their organizations. In the case of training centers or schools they were
responsible for integrating appropriate political education programs into
the normal curricula.
The Company Polwar Organizat ion was (and is in all polwar systems) the
most important element in the entire political warfare system (this is
consonant with there being no polwar without a security system). The basic
reason for this fact is fairly evident: it is at the company level (or
battery in artillery units, perhaps troops in armored or mechanized units)
that one finds the soldiers; battalions are comprised of companies and,
taking a quantum leap upward, so are entire armies. To argue that in line
with this reasoning the squad or fire team is more basic is too reduct ive since
efficient and effective control at that level would be impractical to the
point of self defeat. The company polwar officer is singularly important
then because it is at this level that the polwar system comes into direct
contact with the vast majority of soldiers. At company level, in most
armies, soldiers usually are conscripts rather than professional regulars,
so problems such as discipline, morale and desertation are more acute . The
polwar officer at this level is the only person in the entire system who must
implement all the f unct ions of the polwar organizat ion . He i s a combination
political motivation and indoctrination officer, as well as a chaplain and a
psywar, social welfare, sports and recreation, press and information, civil
affairs and counterintelligence officer.
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The primary mission of the RVNAF company polwar officer was to support
the company coriander by trying to eliminate the conditions which caused low
morale and desertions. He had to create a unit spirit among the troops by
providing them with political and ideological direction through mot ivat ion
and indoctrination programs; and he had to detect and neutralize those
individuals whose activities or even attitudes were prejudicial to the best
interests (according to national policy) of his unit. Meanwhile, he had the
additional psywar duty of assuring a proper relat ionship between his unit and
the civilian populace in the area of operations, and he also was responsible
for psywar operations against the enemy. Some of his rather mundane but
difficult and important duties in attempting to accomplish his primary
mission included: troop and dependent welfare activities, entertainment of
troops (this can mean literally leading them in song! ) , ensuring that proper
sanitary conditions and personal hygiene attitudes existed, and ensuring
that the unit's food and living conditions were adequate. Some of these
duties would be familiar to one who may have had experience as an executive
officer in the lower echelons of the US Army or perhaps another Western army.
This is not surprising since in the RVNAF system the company polwar officer
served also as the unit's executive officer (again, the unified system).
The company level organization was amasterpiece of low level organiza-
tion consisting of the Polwar Officer
,
Polwar NCO, Polwar Fighter Corrmittee,
We 1 f are Corrmi t tee
,
Psywar Team, and several Secur i ty Maintenance Cel Is (see
Chart 16). the Polwar NCO assisted the Polwar Officer in all polwar
activities. The polwar officer and NCO positions were the only ones
prescribed by the TOE (table of organ i zat ion and equipment ) ; the corrmi t tees
and psywar team were informal
,
similar to unit fund corrmi t tees in the US Army
.
Polar tasks had to be performed in addition to regular duties.
Chart 16
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The Polwar Fighter Committee was made up of one soldier from each squad
m the unit. The Polwar Officer selected those whom he considered to be the
natural leaders (key communicators would be the American psychological
operator's term)
. These were formed into teams
,
one team to a platoon. The
mission of the Polwar Fighter was to detect and report the general grievances
of the soldiers to the Polwar Officer. The Officer then attempted to correct
the causes of these grievances
,
fai 1 ing which, he would instruct the Fighters
to go back to their squads and explain why the problems could not be resolved
and why the soldiers should work hard to bear, if they could not overcome,
these adversities. Individuals with personal problems were singled out and
the problems dealt with in a personal way and on an individual basis. The
Fighter also was used by the Polwar Officer to motivate and indoctrinate the
other members of his squad. He did this by "setting the example" and by
explaining to the men why they had to continue to do what they were doing, to
carry on with themissi on or cause." He became the "big brother" to the men
in his squad.
The Welfare Committee was composed of one elected soldier from each
squad and was responsible for organizing sports and educational and cultural
activities within the unit. The Corrmi ttee also organ ized songfests, parties
and other recreational activities, and was responsible for monitoring and
helping to improve the unit's food and general living conditions. All their
activities were aimed at making the soldier's life mo re tolerable, developing
his espr i
t
,
and making him feel like he was a member of a "big family."
The Psywar Team was responsible for all psywar activities within the
unit and was made up of one man per squad or less, appointed by the Polwar
Officer. Psywar Team per sonne 1 were trained in loudspeaker use, poster and
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banner lettering, intelligence collection for polwar use, and the further-
ance of the unit's good relationships with the civilian populace.
Finally, the Security Maintenance Cells consisted of individual
soldiers wi thin the unit who were appointed by the Polwar Officer to serve as
his special informants. They were "compartmentalized" and made their
reports in secret. They were taught to detect "variations" in the behavior
of their fellow soldiers and to report anything which might indicate a soldier
was preparing to desert or was engaged in espionage activity. These "cells"
were located throughout the company at all levels. The nimber of cells per
squad or platoon was at the discretion of the Polwar Officer. Although
theoretically these security personnel were anonymous and operated clandes-
tinely, it would be an unusual company corrmander who would not wish to know
their identities. Whether the Polwar Officer would agree to this would
depend upon a number of factors, not the least of which would be his personal
rapport with the corrmander and perhaps his opinion of that corrmander 's
trustworthiness or even loyalty to the existing government.
Conclus ion
As men t i oned earlier, the essence of political war fare was found in its
application in company level units. The observer who can understand the
activities, organization and techniques at this’ level would have a solid
foundation for understanding the entire concept of political warfare. It
was helpful also to understand why political warfare took the form which
existed in South Vietnam. Throughout its existence there was a constant
struggle between military and political forces within and without the
military to alter the concept, organization and techniques of the system.
American advisors also were actively engaged in this debate as were, to a
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lesser extent, the Nationalist Chinese advisors. The first question which
came to every mi 1 i tary man ' s mi nd was : "Does this sys tern di srupt the concept
of unity of coomnd?" Ideal ly i t did not
,
or should not
;
the system, however
,
never was completely tested, so there was no way of assessing its effective-
ness. The explanation of why the sys tern evo lved as it did andmost especial ly
why it was organized as it was at company level is interesting and may be
instructive and helpful in determining whether such an approach to the
political organization of mi 1 i tary forces in other countries may be feasible.
The t r ad i t i ona 1 author i tar i an way o f corrmand i n or i en t a 1 armi es did not
permit a commander to listen to or even consider the grievances of his troops
who usually were considered just one step above animals. Further there was
little cultural experience of individual human rights or dignity. Even
though in "emerging" countries, such as Vietnam, the people are carefully
courted from time to time, the term "people" refers to the people as a whole
and not as individuals. As a result, passive submission to authority has
long existed among people of such countries, especially in the armed forces,
where the commander exercised virtually unlimited authority. In such a
situation there is no dialogue between the soldier and the commander. And
without such agencies as an "Inspector General," chaplain, or Red Cross
representative, as we have in the US armed forces (or counterpart organiza-
tions in other Western forces), or even recourse to such less formal
procedures as the "commander's hour" favored by some officers commanding at
the company level, 78 the soldier has no recourse for his grievances. His
choices are few and rather bleak: he can take the commander's abuse (or other
hardship inflicted upon him)
,
he can desert, or in extreme cases --such as that
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of the rebellion of Egypt's Central Security Forces in February 1986, which I
will discuss in the concluding part of this thes i s—he may rebel or mutiny.
To some extent the "orientalism" of "losing face" can be applied, in
varying degrees, to contemporary Moslem countries. 79 Obviously, Asian
Moslems aremore prone to exhibit this "Eastern" trait. In the Middle East it
is " Islamici ty" which plays a major role. The point is that if the practice
of Islam (the Shariah*) were strictly adhered to there would be no problem of
confrontation between officer, or commander, and subordinate since according
to the teaching of Mohammed all men are equal. Of course, it follows that
under the strictest observance of this instruction conceivably there could be
no organization such as a modern army. The Soviets discovered, to their
di smay
,
that trying to organize an army with selected leaders and no hierarchy
of rank ( especi a 1 1 y while fighting a war) was imp r act icab le
,
if not imposs-
ible. The fact remains that most nations today whose basic faith is Islam
have hierarchical armed forces (including Shilite Iran) which, as with their
Far Eastern counterparts, inhibits confrontation and presentation of grie-
vances from the ranks. Social stratification plays a major role. Also,
traditional problems of nepotism, desertion, general corruption, ignorance
and poor civilian-military relations exist. In addition to the world of
Islam, parallels exist in the poorer Christian (mainly Catholic) countries of
South and Central America, southern Asian countries such as India, Sri Lanka
and Bangladesh, and among those countries of Africa whose inhabitants are
products of "missionary Christianity" or atavistic animism, or both.
A second sociological phenomenon which exists in Asia and in other parts
of the world (such as Africa) is the extreme difficulty in solving conflict
* The "straight path"; Canon law of Islam (Islamic law)
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between two individuals by direct confrontation. This difficulty is
increased when there is a disparity in rank, class, station or authority
between the two individuals. If a soldier makes even a mild complaint to an
officer, especially a commander, the officer, but most especially one in
command, "loses face." When a real conflict exists, the conmander cannot
admit his fault and rectify the situation. The superior is always "correct"
and the subordinate always a "troublemaker" who doesn't understand "his
place .
"
The oriental solution to this situation has always been to insert a "go
between" to mediate conflicts. Thus the political warfare officer and his
organization, in all the Asian examples that have been discussed, came into
existence to serve as "go between" (in addition to all their other polwar
duties) to fill the vacuum between the troops and the commander
. Grievances
can be brought to the polwar organization (or, in another sense, through it)
without attacking the dignity of the commander. The polwar officer person-
alizes the relationships within the unit in order to provide the soldier with
a feeling of fami lial security in the military after he has been uprooted from
his own family. Ideally, he is made to feel that he can take his personal
problems
,
those he would normal ly take to his parents, to his polwar officer.
To enhance this feeling of familial reassurance the polwar organization
engages in such homely activities as listening to general grievances,
discussing personal problems, and even teaching songs to the troops,
activities which the commander could not engage in without detracting from
his image.
The primary objective of the polwar officer then is to support the
commander by el iminati ng the cond i t i ons wh i ch cause 1 ow moral e and desertion
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(or worse), by creating a unified spirit among the troops and providing them
political or ideological direction through motivation and indoctrination
programs, and by detecting and neutralizing individuals whose activities are
prejudicial to the interests of the unit. His additional duties of ensuring
good civilian-military relations and of conducting psywar against the enemy
are secondary to this primary mission. Let us turn now, in the conclusion of
this thesis, to the possible application of polwar elsewhere in the world
today
.
PART III THE RELEVANCE OF POLWAR TODAY
Introduction
The fundamental inquiry of this thesis, as stated in the introduction,
is: Would a polwar system such as that of South Vietnam in the 1960s have
application to countries of the "free world" today, especially those with
large standing military forces? A corollary to this question might be:
What role, if any, can the United States play in introducing such a system to
such countries?
In order to test the applicability of RVNAF-type polwar today i t may be
helpful to look at Egypt, whose favor the US has courted since the British
presence there demater ial i zed following the Suez Crisis of 1956 . The US has,
except during interruptions such as the Egyptian-Soviet rapprochement,
provided much mi 1 i tary and economic assistance to Egypt
. But whi lemoney and
material poured in, conditions among the Egypt i an masses
,
including those in
the armed forces, saw little improvement. Following the equivocal conclu-
sion of the 1973 War, economic and social conditions were exacerbated by a
feeling of isolation from much of the Arab world caused by the late President
Sada t's peace initiative with Israel. Added to this was the rise of Isl ami sm
which, after inspiring the assassination of his predecessor, continues to
plague the regime of Hosni Mubarak. One manifestation of Egypt's many
discontents was the mutiny of her Central Security Forces in late February
1986.
Egypt's Central Security Forces Rampage
On 25 February 1986 some 10,000 members of Egypt's Central Security
Forces, or CSF, joined later by an unknown number of civilians, went on a
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rampage. They burned and vandalized luxury hotels and night clubs near the
Pyramids in Giza, adjacent to Cairo, inflicting some $165 million worth of
damage. The young conscripts—whose tasks normally include curbing riots,
guarding embassies and public buildings and installations, and controlling
traffic— fought battles with military units, helicopter gunships, tanks and
armored personnel carriers which were sent in to quell the uprising.
Meanwhile, the unrest spread to other quarters and suburbs of Cairo. The
inmates of a large prison in Tura, near Cairo, including many Muslim
religionists, were set free. Government troops also clashed with CSF
members in Asyut and Sohag in upper Egypt and in I smai 1 ia and Tenth of Ramadan
City, northeast of Cairo.®®
An around-the-clock curfew was ordered for Cairo and some governorates
;
after four days, as peace was restored, the curfew gradually was lifted.
Casualties amounted to 107 dead and 719 wounded or injured. 81 More than
2 , 500 members of the CSF and some 700 civilians were arrested, and within a few
days the Minister of the Interior as wel 1 as 21 ,000 of his CSF conscripts were
di smi ssed
;
four police corrmander s were reduced i n rank .82 Pres i dent Mubarak
blamed the rampage on "a small group of devi at ioni sts , " and added that
parliamentary investigations had shown that no foreign, religious or
ideological plots were behind the uprising. 83
The mut i ny , which had been brewi ng for some time, underscores the deeply
rooted economic and social problems and continuing social crises facing a
count ry wi th an exploding populat ion, a crushing foreign debt and a historyof
three costly wars, following a revolutionary change in government, over a
peri od of on 1 y twenty years . Egypt 's current forty-eight million people are
increasing at the rate of about one million every nine months . 84 Aside from
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the usual reasons for high population growth in an underdeveloped society,
Egypt’s religionists maintain that western interest in population control in
their country is part of an imperialist plot to limit the number of Muslims in
the world. The intensive American involvement in family planning programs
widens; therefore, their resistance to birth control. After all, prestige
in rural Egypt (for both males and females)
,
where mater ial assets are few, is
tied closely to the number of children a couple have. Also, there is an
entrenched belief that the answer to a growing population lies in increased
development rather than limited family size.
During the last two years a steep decline in world oil prices has
"robbed" the country of foreign currency. The related loss of remittances
from Egyptian workers who had lost their jobs in the Persian Gulf’s slowing
oil economy with its attendant drop in Suez Canal revenue, together with
stagnating tourism in the aftermath of the Achille Lauro affair serve to
emphasize the economy's underlying weakness. Many Egyptians, however,
trace their economic problems to the open door pol icy inf i tah
,
adopted in 1974
by the late President Anwar Sadat. Rather than long-term investment in
productive industries leading to a stronger and more stable economy, infitah
merely produced a very weal thymercan tile class. As a result it widened the
gap between the wealthy few and the poor majority.
On 7 October 1985, Palestinian gunmen hijacked the Achille Lauro, an
Italian cruise liner, off the Egyptian coast. With Egypt's promise of safe
passage the hijackers surrendered: but when US warplanes forced down the
Egyptian airliner carrying these hijackers the Egyptians felt humiliated.
For ordinary Egyptians, this confirmed what they had long suspected: That
their count ry was little more than a co 1 ony of the United States. University
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students indifferent cities demonstrated against the US; but it takes little
in Egypt to turn any complaint into one against the Egypt ian government
. For
centuries the Egypt ians were ruled by occupiers
,
no matter under what guises,
and most Egyptians, even those who are too young to have lived under colonial
or other foreign rule, still carry their old feelings of resentment.
Religionists and leftists, opposed to Egypt's ties with the US and Israel,
became even more vocal, raising government concern.
The dust had barely settled when, in November, an Egypt-Air liner,
enroute to Malta, was hijacked. In an attempt to free the passengers,
Egyptian troops who stormed the plane started a fire which killed sixty of
those on board. Again, Egyptians sharply criticized their government for
the clumsy handl ing of the rescue operation. A few weeks later the CSF were
used to suppress other disturbances in Cairo and the Delta which followed
rumours that the al leged suicide of an Egyptian border pol iceman, jailed for
killing seven Israelis in the Sinai, was actually a murder corrmitted by
members of Israeli intelligence who had visited the prisoner in the guise of
reporters; the rumours alleged further that the Egyptian government was
involved in a cover-up of the incident
. Soon after that the CSF were used to
suppress cot ton worker s striking for pay increases at Mahala al-Kubra in the
Delta. The next blow came in February, the month of the CSF uprising, when
Jordan's King Hussein ended his Egyptian-backed cooperation with the
Palestine Liberation Organization, an event which left Egypt at loose ends,
with the ghost of the "separate peace" with Israel wound around the
government's neck.
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The CSF rampage of February, 1986 is, undoubtedly, the most serious
internal problem which President Mubarak has faced since he took office in
October, 1981 following the assassination of President Sadat. As Mubarak
said at the time:
This is a treacherous blow to the march of this
people struggling for its livelihood and itsfuture. This happened at a time when Egypt was
making every effort to develop and build on every
field and to confront difficult economic condi-
t ions .85
It was at this time that Mubarak appointed the Governor of Asyut to the post of
Minister of the Interior. The newminister, in his former post as leader in
Asyut--a stronghold of Muslim and Christian fundamental is ts—had acquired
wide experience in quelling the 1981 revolt, which cost Sadat his life, and
the subsequent religious turbul ence . 86
Understandably, one may question whether the CSF insurrection was as
spontaneous as it may have seemed. Some have suggested that
,
considering the
simultaneous uprising in different and separated governates in the country,
the action may have been an organized attempt to topple the government. To
support this, the Egyptian Minister of Information at that time reportedly
revealed that fifteen of the multineers who were arrested each were carrying
exactly fifty Egyptian pounds (currency)
,
raising the possibility that they
may have been paid saboteurs. There was other speculation about the
organized involvement of religious zealots and agents provocateurs . 87 The
majority, however, saw the rampage as genuinely spontaneous, feeding off a
deep-rooted discontent caused, among other things, by price increases,
sporadic shortages of food and other goods, a trend toward religious
reconstitution, and more importantly, intolerable frustration in the ranks
of the Central Security Forces.
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The government, on its part, declared that the conscripts were outraged
when rumours spread that their tour of service was to be extended from three to
four years. The government denied the truth of these rinours. Newspaper
reports that a salary increase was being denied by the government whi le at the
same time the nimber of free train tickets for CSF menbers was being reduced
also were suggested as factors adding to the anger within the CSF. Whatever
the validity of those reports may have been the fact remains that those CSF
draftees, drawn from Egypt’s poorest rural backwaters, are notoriously ill-
treated by their middle-class officers and subjected to the perhaps less
tangible but equally humiliating fate of suffering the jibes and contempt of
their more sophisticated counterparts, the Cairene (and other) university
students. Though conditions for these young conscripts may have improved
somewhat (most probably, mainly in a cosmetic way) their lot is a miserable
one. Quartered in wretched barracks facing the luxury tourist hotels of
Ca iro, they are pa id the equi va 1 ent of three do liars per month
,
enough to buy
two soft drinks in those same hotels which, not surprisingly became their
first targets when their tolerance reached its limit.
Though they come from humble backgrounds these "dirt poor" young men
have a quiet pride and dignity, based largely on their religion which they
practice with more seriousness than the more sophisticated city dwellers.
These dissatisfied (but armed ) members of traditional Muslim peasant f ami 1 -
ies were effectively given the responsibility of Cairo's security. Torn by
the sharp contrast between their own lifestyle and that of the people they
were protecting, whether the "ha If -naked" Western tourist (an abomination by
Muslim standards) or the snobbish and extravagant Cairene, the downtrodden
youngsters simply vented their anger on the most conspiciuous and hedonistic
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symbols of the wealth they were denied: the luxurious hotels that were handy
just outside the gates of their camps. After all, i t was just a cut in bread
subsidies which led to the huge food riots that almost overthrew President
Sadat in 1977.
The CSF incident, therefore, is not just a case of the CSF versus the
upper classes or the Egyptian government; it is symptomatic and representa-
tive of the discontent of the whole sprawling mass of have nots against
symbols of inequity and humi 1 iat ion— i t is the violent cry of deepseated
frustration emanating from all but the uppermost layers of Egyptian society.
For the poorest
,
among whom the rioting conscripts can be nimbered, it is the
realization that they never will be able to improve their living standards,
let alone attain the riches (to a Westerner, especially to an American, this
must be seen as a relative term) they can see around them. For the less poor,
such as (for example) noncorrmi ss i oned officers and commissioned officers in
the lower grades in all the armed services, it is the knowledge that any
improvement they may have experienced in the past quite probably will not be
repeated. Nevertheless, the President's senior political advisor insisted
tha t the street bat ties did not const i tute a mas s upr i s i ng . 88 Thi s statement
totally ignores the fact that the social fabric of the "Arab" world's largest
,
poorest
,
and most inf luencial country can now only be held together by the one
pivotal force that ensures internal security: the Egyptian army. It is
small wonder then that Egyptians are talking increasingly of Field Marshal
Abu-Ghazala, the curent Minister of Defense, as a strong possible candidate
O Q
as the future fifth military president.
Contrary to the centuries-old experience the Egyptians have endured,
threats to their country now seem to come more from within. If the under lying
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causes of the "February Rampage" aremore profound and complex than the sudden
and relatively localized mutiny of the CSF would suggest, so too are the
implications, both for the future of Egypt and for the Middle east generally,
For Egypt, continuing instabi 1 i ty wi 1 1 only help to strengthen the appeal of
groups hostile to President Mubarak's policies. Both left-wing radicals,
and more importantly, Muslim religionists would benefit, and the ascendancy
of either would threaten Egypt 's existing measure of democracy and secular-
ism, and its pro-Western stance. But any change of this order would have
effects reaching far beyond Egypt's borders, especially if the change were
induced by the religionists' wing.
The CSF rebellion was put down by army forces; but what would have
happened if the soldiers had dec i ded to join the r ebe Is? Perhaps the Mubarak
regime has been fortunate thus far, but how long can the loyalty of the armed
forces be assumed with any certainty? If the role of the armed forces is seen
by the people ( including the members of the armed forces themselves) as one of
suppression, as one of a praetorian guard, Egypt could once more experience a
revolution, probably inspired in large part by Islamists, not as limited or
eas i ly contained as the February Rampage
,
but of sei smi c proportions; and the
US and its Western allies could be faced with another "Iran." Speaking about
the army's role under King Farouk, Anwar A1 Sadat once said:
(T)he nice people imagined that the army was a
simple instrument of domination, a kind of whip in
the king's hands wi th which he could keep the poor at
his mercy . . . Faruk's praetorian guard and not the
nation's safeguard.
. .
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The institution of a polwar organization now to fit the needs of Egypt ' s
armed forces and the country as a whole could be instrumental in the pursui t of
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stability and development for the Egyptian people,
could also provide an excellent example for any number
Such an institution
of developing nations
throughout the world.
The U.S. Role: Ci vi 1 -Mi 1 i tary Models and Control
Any role which the US might play in helping to make the armed forces of a
given country a more effective instrument of the national policy of that
country has a great deal to do with American foreign policy per se
. There are
certain countries which the US government favors, others which it attempts to
cultivate," and still others whose governments are held to be inimical to US
interests. It is not the intent of this thesis to argue the validity of US
foreign policy; to ask whether Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Norman Podhoretz are
right in preferring to support "traditional" authoritarian governments
(dictatorships) which are less repressive than revolutionary autocracies
(some form of Marxism) ,91 or if Noam Chomsky is right when he calls White House
i ns i s tence on i ncr eased mi 1 i tary spending and the need to cont inue contain-
ment of corrmunist takeovers" with "low intensity conflict" a "dirty little
lie. "92 But it is almost certain that whatever its policy the United States
wi 1 1 cont inue to support some countries and many of those countries will be of
the same general type as was the Republic of Vietnam: industrially and
economi ca 1 1 y poor , ma inly agr icultural, educationally be 1 ow an acceptable
standard, with disproportionately large military-paramilitary forces (by
1970 the RVN had about three million under arms within a population of some
eighteen million), and wi th a government threatened by a strong and potenti-
ally violent opposition. In such a country, control of the armed forces is
crucial to maintenance of governmental status quo. The fact iona 1 i sm which
developed in Marcos's forces in the Philippines in 1986 led to his downfall.
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Today, in 1987, it seems the US was correct in supporting the Aquino
government which replaced the dictatorial Marcos regime. Now that the
government of Corazon Aquino has been in power for over a year and appears to
be genuinely interested in the welfare of the Filipino people, the US could
consider urging that government to implement a polwar system in the
Philippines' armed forces to assist in that country's development. As
Janowitz says, "The act of national liberation (in this case not from a
colonial or imperial power but from an internal dictatorial regime)—with or
without force establishes a pragmatic basis for a legitimate government.
The military, with its symbols of authority and force, is part of the
apparatus of a legitimate government
.
"93 But given that this were to happen,
that the armed forces of a country such as the Philippines, through an
efficient polwar system instituted with the help of the US, became a more
effective instrument of legit imate civilian control, how then could that
civilian government ensure continued control of those armed forces? The
answer lies essentially in the very legitimacy of that government and in its
relationship with the military forces. Claude Welch and Arthur Smith
correctly state:
A1 though in a civic polity the coercive power of the
armed forces may be great, the military political
power is minimized by a complex of factors that
inhibits the military's employment of coercion
independent of civilian direction. The principal
limiting factor, of course, is the very effective-
ness and legitimacy of the civilian political
inst i tut ions . 94
It is important also that the new government realize that despite any
"politicization" which might be imposed on the military structure, it must
accept the fact that the military, to a large extent, must exist in an
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independent sphere of activity and therefore military values and interests
must not be subordinated within those of the larger society (as was the case
with Mao's forces following the Great Cultural Revolution).
In all polities with which polwar may be concerned there are political
(one can say civilian for our purposes since I am not speaking of praetorian
government by the military itself) and military elites. Let us define
quickly the po 1 i t ical -mi 1 i tary models as: aristocratic, democratic,
totalitarian, and garrison state. The socially and functionally integrated
ar i s toe rat i c mode 1 of pre-industrial Europe is archaic; the three remaining
have currency. 95
The democratic model, more an objective than a reality of political
policy, is found only in some industrialized Western states, and operates
under the ass ump tion that military leaders can be control led and mo tivated by
their s t rong professional ethics. The totalitarian mode 1
,
according to some
sources ,96 replaced the ar i s toe rat ic model when
,
in the process of historical
change, there was no fundamental and lasting development toward the
democratic model. Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and the USSR are examples.
Morris Janowitz contends that the garrison state evolves with the weakening
of an effective democratic structure:
The garrison state is not a throwback to military
dictatorships (but) is the end result of the ascent
to power of the military elite under condi t ions of
prolonged international tension. Internal
freedom is hampered, and the preparation for war
becomes overriding (and) military groups directly
or indirectly wield unprecedented amounts of
political and administrative power. 97
Examples of this last model could include Egypt, Syria, Israel, Nicaragua
and, in the opinion of some, the United States.
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These political-military elite models may be clarified further by
Samuel Huntington's paradigm of subjective-objective control. "The one
prime essential for any system of civilian control is the minimizing of
military power," Huntington writes, and by "military power" he means the
political power of the military. 98 Subjective civilian control, says
Huntington, consists of minimizing military power by maximizing civilian
power, and this always means concentrating that power in some particular
civilian group or groups
. This can be seen in the totalitarian models
,
wi th
Mao s CCP control over the PLA as a prime example. Objective civilian
control, on the other hand, achieves the reduction of political power
potential in the military by professionalizing the military since this
renders them politically sterile and neutral (and) produces the lowest
possible level of military political power with respect to all civilian
groups. "99 Also,
it preserves that essential element of power which
is necessary for the existence of a military
profess i on . A high 1 y trained professi ona 1 officer
corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any
civilian group which secures legitimate authority
within the state.
If it is argued that such decrease in the military's power may lead to
increased power among more bellicose civilian groups
,
then it can be gainsaid
that the very reduction of the military's potential interventionary threat
makes the same military forces a stronger instrument in carrying out the
policies of the legitimate government, perhaps by controlling those same
bel 1 icose groups
.
The weakening of civi 1 ian supremacy which occurs in the garrison state
is unavoidable. Therefore, with military groups wielding significant
political and administrative power the importance of a viable coalition
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between civilian and military authorities cannot be overs t ressed
;
the
military can retain its organizational independence so long as proper
alliances can be maintained with civilian political groups. One such
al 1 lance could be that of the nation's polwar officerswithcivilian leaders
at the ministerial or cabinet level (in most countries the Ministry of
Defense )
.
The countries with which we are concerned (for any possible polwar
application) pr obab 1 y would bes t be desc r i bed as democrat i c ga rrison states.
What must be understood is that politicizing the armed forces (i.e.,
instituting polwar) of such countries does not automatically imply making
those armed forces a more dangerous potential interventionary political
force. On the contrary
,
it is the very professionalism and stability which
the polwar process provides which wouldmake the armed forces less a threat to
legit imate civil central governments and more of an effective instrument of
power for those governments, leading away from the need for subjective
control and toward more democratization as the state achieves more internal
stability.
In cases such as the Phi 1 ippines it is the army which must help to achieve
this stability, despite the view that military forces become less reliable
when used in police or counterinsurgency roles. 101 The armed forces of such
"new nations" must be employed in any role conceivable to assist in the
stabilization and internal security of that nation. So it is with the
Philippines in countering the NPA (National People's Army) threat, in the
newly democratized Argentina in countering latent despotism and tyrannical
injustices in and by i ts armed forces
,
and i n Egypt where
,
as I have discussed,
the armed forces were needed to put down the CSF rebellion in 1986.
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In sum, polwar, or "politicizing" military forces, does not implymaking
those forces more politically active in opposing a legitimate government; it
implies rather, the promotion of high professionalism and the use of
indoctrination, soldier welfare programs and surve i 1 1 ance means adequate to
ensure the loyalty, cooperation and support of those forces in developing a
state system which will further the real interests of the people of that
state. And those forces should not be seen merely as a "praetorian guard"
garrisoned and standing by ( in time of peace) ready to defend their government
from any oppos ition, internal or external. They can
,
as Janowi tz points out,
cont r ibute to "developing publ ic works
,
roads
,
and engineer ing pro jects . . .
relief and economic rehabilitation after major national di sasters .
"
In countries which the US chooses to assist
,
the goal should be objective
civilian control, making the military a tool, not an opponent or compet i tor
,
of the state. Subjective control, in the case of totalitarian states,
especially during critical stages in their development, "civi 1 ianizes" the
military, making it "the mirror of the state," or as Huntington puts it:
The antithesis of objective civilian control is
military participation in politics; civilian
control decreases as the military become
progressively involved in institutional, class,
and constitut ional politics. Subjective civilian
control, on the other hand, presupposes this
involvement . 103
Although polwar may survive for a time under subjective control, as in
Trotsky's Red Army and Mao ' s PLAof the late 1 960s
,
military professi ona 1 i sm
eventually will try to reject it; the military elite will always seek that
control which max imi zes profess iona 1 i sm and ensures "that distribution of
political power between military and civilian groups which i s mos t conducive
to the emergence of professi ona 1 a 1 1 i t udes and behavior among the members o f
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the officer corps. "104 Basically, military specialists abhor politics; but
if they are permitted to execute their military duties without interference
from "outsiders" they will tolerate polwar officers who prove that they can
provide tangible assistance in the execution of those duties. In any case,
as Janowitz writes:
Those organizational and professional qualities
which make it possible for the military of a new
nation to accumulate political power, are the same
as those wh i ch 1 imi t its ability to rule prope r 1 y . .
. while it is relatively easy for the military to
seize power in a new nation, it is much more
difficult for it to govern. Thus once political
power has been achieved, the mi 1 i tary must develop
mass political organizations of a civilian type, or
i t mus t work out viable relationships with civilian
political groups. 105
In short, politicians are needed to govern a country; whether they are
civilians or former military leaders is immaterial.
Since Argentina has been mentioned, a note on South American totali-
tarian sys terns is needed. The conservat ive
,
almost " feudal
- 1 i ke" system of
military dictatorship for which South Amer ican countries have been notorious
is different than that developed in Western Europe in the first part of this
century. The military dictatorship of one man or junta directly dominates
both military and civilian life. Admittedly, the Peron regime was a
combination of this older "hereditary" dictatorship and some of the newer
elements found in Europe. Unfortunately today Argent ina still is suffering
from the latent effects of the dictatorial military elitism of its past.
Fortunately however
,
publ ic opinion in that count ry seems to be on the side of
the newly emergent democracy of President Alfonsin. Here then is another
example (such as the Philippines) where the US, with a properly organized
polwar assistance and advisory effort
,
could assist the Argentinian govern-
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ment in stabilizing their armed forces and, fostering a system of democratic
objective civilian control
,
make them helpful and not interventionary in the
government's efforts in development and internal solidarity. But before
such a polwar effort were initiated a cooperative coalition of civil and
military power would have to be established. The US should institute no
polwar programs in countries whose armed forces are not reasonably stable or
in countries with governments that repress the aspirations of the people for
more democracy.
I f the US mi 1 i tary
,
in a polwar assistance and advisory role
,
i s to be an
effective instrument of national policy, then the c i vi 1 -mi 1 i tary relation-
ship within the US must be stable and work in the genuine interest of the US
public, the new na t ions who would be the bene ficiaries of polwar systems
,
and
the rest of the world. With the prior approval of the government of the
'country of interest," the civilian pol icymakers--Congress
,
the Department
of State, the President
,
with the advice and consent of his National Security
Counc i 1 --and in close coordination with the military elite (including the
ostensibly civilian but quas i -mi 1 i tary Secretary of Defense) should be the
final arbiters of whether a polwar assistance-advisory effort will be
undertaken
.
Once an affirmative decision has been made the military experts would
then be responsible for the professional execution of the program. Under the
present system in the US the Chai rman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army
Chief of Staff ( since polwar efforts would be concerned mainly wi th the ground
forces in the host countries) would be the key figures in keeping the
government's top civilians informed of progress, forecasts, budgetary
matters and all the other details necessary for the efficient conduct of the
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program. The US CIA probably would play a role (a passive one, one hopes ) in
keeping the government informed of the political situation both inside and
outside the armed forces of the country being aided. If it begins to appear
that the host country is "going sour" in its stance toward the US, the polwar
effort should be withdrawn. If the wrong choice was made to begin with the
responsibility must (and should) lie with the US civilian leaders. In all
countries, great or small, the military should be merely an instrument of
policy, not a formulator. The counterproduc t ivi ty which would result from
supporting a nation that is or becomes an enemy hardly warrants mentioning.
On the other hand, polwar assistance to a country which is undecided in its
attitude to the US could be fruitful.
According to V. G. Kiernan, Americans should feel comfortable working
with the large military forces of other countries since the US itself is
highly militari zed and a compat ibility exists between militarism and capi -
t a 1 i sm
.
Itself increasingly militarized, America
found the men of the sword attractive. In
countries as raw and ramshackle as many of this era
(post 1945)
,
an army can be the nearest thing to the
great indus t r i al -f inane i al organizations which
dominate American life. A modern army is an
embodiment of technology, closely geared to
industry by its equipment, rational like big busi-
ness in its structure and routine . . . and with an
analogous chain of corrmand. Militarism blends
with capitalism as smoothly as it did with feudal-
i sm. 106
Given that the United States will support the military forces of certain
countries whose governments may not be totally stable, we may now ask
ourselves what form that support should take.
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In the Spring o£ 1971
,
following his return from Ethiopia, then US Army
Chief of Staff Westmoreland instructed his Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil
Affairs/Military Government to contact the US Army Institute for Military
Assistance (USAIMA) at Ft. Bragg to "discuss advisory requirements for
Ethiopia." When asked about what "kind of problems" and "concepts USAIMA
should concentrate on" in training men for advisory duty in Ethiopia
Westmoreland’s representative replied that the Ethiopians needed training in
"internal defense" and "internal development" in about equal parts since
General Westmoreland was "very much concerned about the lack of appreciat ion
on the part of the Ethiopians for the Civi 1 Affairs approach needed to win the
hearts and minds of the people." (This last trite phrase was used--with
fervor by dedicated but ignorant staff and psyop officers, but with sarcasm
among combat troops--persistent ly when Westmoreland was Conmander, US
Military Assistance Comnand
,
Vietnam [COMUSMACV] ) . Westmoreland’s
assistant went on to elaborate the problem and requirement:
'They' (the Ethiopians) have the ability to
sweep through an area but do not have an appreci-
ation for developing a government in the areas.
They have got to know how to set up hamlet security
forces so the local governments can survive, plus
they have to knowhow to get the people to help them.
Also, they need to know those things which will
develop an area such as roads, medical facilities,
schools, etc. Presently, vast areas of the country
are not in the hands of the government except where
the military forces are.
The memorandum which contains this informat ion 107 is dated 19 May 1971,
a time when intensive instruction was being conducted at USAIMA in the
history, theory and practice of polwar. Whether "free world" polwar based
upon the South Vietnamese model may have helped the Ethiopians to organize
their armed forces is open to question. But nothing could have been easier,
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during this period of US support for polvvar in Vietnam, than to organize a team
of polvvar advisors (perhaps with technical assistance from the Republic of
China) for deployment to Ethiopia. With proper organization and planning,
adequate funding and dedicated execution such a venture might have played a
major role in the political stabilization of Ethiopia and perhaps, to some
extent, even helped to avert or alleviate the terrible famine of the 1980s
(which took ten years to develop)
,
while serving US foreign policy interests
in western central Africa.
For any polwar effort such as the hypothetical case just described the
importance of proper advisors cannot be overstressed. Advisors for politi-
cal warfare duty must themselves be not merely schooled in its theory and
practice and t rained in i t s techniques
;
they must themselves be motivated and
indoctrinated in polwar as a virtual ideology in itself. Moreover, the
advisory group in the "host" country cannot "feed that country a square
democratic meal, as the US tried to do in Vietnam. In his report to the
American people after he and his colleagues returned from a "fact finding
mission" to Vietnam in 1974, former US ambassador John M. Allison admitted,
with obvious re 1 uctance
,
that "politically, South Vietnam is not yet a mode 1
of Amer ican-s tyle democracy," adding that "in this, Vietnam does not differ
f rom . . . the Ph i 1 i ppi nes where the US spent fifty years trying to instill the
fundamentals of Amer ican-type democracy ." 108 The reasons for this in both
countries
,
says Allison, are ethnic and social, not political. This report
,
which staunchly defends every mistake the United States made in Vietnam, does
not even mention the polwar effort (about which I apprised Allison after he
expressed his ignorance of the who 1 e enterpr i se ) . A1 though polwar concepts
,
organization, planning and opera t ions mu s t be moni tor ed closely (at least in
102
the early stages) and some supervision is required throughout its operations
as long as the US is funding part or al 1 of the effort
,
the country of interest
must be free to establish and maintain its own polity and objectives in both
domestic and foreign policy. Should its governance become inimical to US
policy or interests (such as appears to have happened with the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua) and diplomacy and negotiation fail, the US representatives should
leave. However
,
do not think i t i s overly sanguine to believe that if the US
effort is more altruistic than egoistic the chances would be better than even
that the governmental system final ly selected by the host country and kept in
place at least partly by a US inspired and assisted polwar program would be
compatible with US interests.
The Amer i can adv isors for the sensitive po 1 wa r mission mus t be careful ly
selected. Race and ethnicity should fit the country to which the advisor is
assigned, if pos sible. In fact, the entire covert po licy of assigning only a
limited number of officers of a certain extraction to countries of their
ancestral origin because they are not considered representative of the US
Army should be el iminated. 109 Probably, there are numbers of Asian (the
University of Hawaii ROTC program graduates hundreds annually), black,
Hispanic and "Arabic" officers who, with proper training would be adequate
for the task. The claim, held mainly by US career officers of Anglo-Saxon,
middle-class background, that such representatives may permit racial or
ethnic sympathies to interfere with "the proper performances of their duties"
is sheer nonsense. America should utilize its multiracial, multiethnic
resources. The appalling fact is that in too many cases American military
advisors in general are totally unsuited for their assignments. Often
racially prejudiced, contemptuous of their foreign counterparts, unquali-
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fied inany foreign languages and often total ly bored wi th their duties, they
muddle through their tours of overseas' duties and, much like Evelyn Waugh'
s
"odious American tourists," do nothing to improve the US image abroad. 110
V. G. Kiernan, in discussing the inefficiency and mi sappropr iat ion of
much of US foreign aid tells of a Vietnamese who allegedly once said to Martha
Gellhorn, "US aid is a long pipe wi th many holes in it. Only a fewdrops reach
the peasants. "1 1 1 A recent press report alleges that as much as thirty
percent of US aid to the rebels in Afghanistan is being "syphoned off,"
probably by the Pakistanis. It is a fact that much US military foreign aid,
..hether in funds or materiel, is either misappropriated, wasted or simply
stolen by government officials or their agents. The universal system of
payroll procedure in the RVNAF (beginning at division level) consisted
roughly in the divisional commanding general taking half the division payrol 1
for himself and sending the remainder to his three regimental commanders in
equal amounts; there the process was repeated, with the three battalion
commanders of each regiment receiving the residue from their respective
regiments and so on until the troops received what was left, if anything was
left. 112 The funds for payment of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces were
provided, as was the funding for the entire war, by the United States.
Problems with material aid exist also, arising mainly from lack of
efficient management and supervision. Many items are sold on the "black
market" or appropriated for personal use. Also, since US advisors rarely
speak the host country's language and US technical manuals are publ ished only
in Engl i sh more problems arise, espec i al 1 y where equipment i s sophist icated
and counterpart soldiers lack technical skills.
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Aid in the form of polwar specialists who are language qualified,
culturally attuned to the host country, thoroughly schooled in polwar
techniques, and dedicated to close supervision of polwar operations and
assets (equipment and funds) might be much more productive than many other
forms of military aid, especially the practice of merely conveying materiel
and money to the country of interest. One of the purposes of polwar is the
elimination, or at least the significant reduction, of corruption in the
armed forces. Ideally, the polwar system will require less and less
supervision of all its aspects, including aid money and equipment, as it
becomes "institutionalized."
Conclusion
Successful polwar systems have been and should continue to be tailored
to fit certain needs
,
so al 1 systems should be studied before the RVNAF model
i s adapted to suit the requirements of any future po 1 war user
;
social
,
ethnic
,
political, rel igious and even historical factors must be cons idered. And,
having decided upon an approach, the positive aspects of polwar must be
stressed, not the negative ones (such as company level security cells),
although unfortunately these latter cannot be avoided. In Iran in the early
1950s, the CIA, with the help of Israel's security section, the Mossad,
instituted the infamous SAVAK in their successful effort to return the Shah to
power. As in the case of Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, US
authorities, while speaking mainly of the threat of a corrmunist takeover,
were outraged when a noncorrmunist nationalist government began controlling
economic and strategic resources (their own) which were important to the
Wes t . 1 1 3 The point I ammaki ng
,
aside fromcalling attention to a grave error
in US po 1 i cy , is that polwar, to enjoy cont inued success in the achievement of
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its objectives, must be a balanced, coordinated effort. Its three main
pill ars--good leadership, political supervision and secur i ty--mus t blend in
concert (although during certain phases one may be stressed, as with
Trotsky's Cheka during the early history of the Red Army). In other words, if
the Shah of Iran had been a "good" leader at the head of a worthy government,
use of the SAVAK (security) as the only control system would probably have led
to his eventual downfal 1 anyway. If one argues that a leader whose interests
are those of his people does not need polwar or some control system, I can only
say that while this may be true in certain Western countries
,
it is not true in
countries such as Iran. And I should add that all Western countries, though
they may have no highly structured control organizations such as I described
in the earlier parts of this thesis, have nontheless some systemof control,
usual ly a comb ination of propaganda (ma i n 1 y through use of the corrmun i ca t i ons
media) and security forces (in the US, the FBI, CIA and NSA)
. As Jacques
Ellul points out:
Power is regarded as legitimate when it
derives from the sovereignty of the people, rests on
the popular will, expresses and follows that
popular will
. . . .
The masses are there; they are
interested in politics. The government cannot act
without them. So, what can it do?
Only one solution is possible: as the govern-
ment cannot fol low opinion
,
opinion must fol low the
government. One must convince this present,
ponderous, impass ioned mass that the government's
decisions are legitimate and that its foreign
policy is correct. The democratic State, precise-
ly because it believes in the expression of public
opinion and does not gag it, must channel and shape
that opinion if it wants to be realistic and not
11/1
follow an ideological dream.
To translate Ellul's view into reality, the US should reinstitute a
program for the selective use of polwar in countries which may need such a
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system. The documents necessary for this-studies
,
lesson plans, programs
of instruction for advisors, foreign officers and US comnanders and staff
officers, "after action" reports, and others--may still repose in their vault
files at Ft. Bragg. But information recently received by the author from the
Psychological Operations Department of the Special Warfare Center at Ft.
Bragg made it plain that no US polwar training programs, advisory efforts or
studies are underway. In short, the US government appears to have no more
interest in the subject, and, as was the case with Vietnam in the mid 1950s,
now has nothing to offer except psywar or, to use the broader term, psyop.
Obviously, the United States abandoned polwar when it abandoned Vietnam.
If the United States were to reintroduce polwar as an aid to friendly
developing nations, adj_ polwar systems--Russian or Chinese Comminist (and
their satellites), Ch i nese Na t i ona list and Viet namese—should be exami ned i n
order to determine which part(s) of any or al 1 should be appl ied in a specific
country. The record of successful polwar practice thus far favors the
corrmunist mi 1 itary forces
,
both during major upheavals (such as the Russian
and Chinese revolutions) and "low intesity conflicts," and particularly in
their af terma ths when stability among thevictoriousmilitary forces was ( and
is) essential. Nonetheless, the obviously "good" or effective aspects of
those corrmunist structures and operations should be considered as well as
those practi ced or at tempted by " f ree wor Id" countries
,
such as the Repub lies
of China or Vietnam, for possible future use, and adapted to the needs of
countries whose governmental forms are non-corrmuni s t . A totally pragmatic
approach should be taken; certain "labels" which may be offensive to some
Westerners, especially Amer i cans--pol i t i cal corrmissar, political indoc-
trination, clandestine secur i ty--can be changed to make their acceptance
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se
more palatable (the fact Is all nations, "danocracies" included, foster the
same activities or entities in seme less coordinated form or other anyway).
The West does not have to accept the politics or ideology of eemnunist states
along with their concepts and practices of polwar. The objectives of the
enterprise are, after all, what must be kept in mind.
Whatmust be kept inmind also is that, as stated earlier, polwar must not
be seen as a cure for all the world's political, social or developmental ills.
Without legitimacy of goals, both on the part of the "host country" and the
"sponsor" who provides the necessary aid (the US), and without a genuine
belief in the system itself and high mot ivation in its implement at ion
,
polwar
will r ema in, at least in the free wor Id," mere 1 y a "gadge t " of more or less
interest
. Polwar is not just a system of better feeding
,
hous ing, paying and
entertaining soldiers--it is an organized effort through which the soldiers
themselves can play a role in assisting a legitimate government to better
provide the military (and their civilian counterparts) with those and other
less tangible but perhaps even more important benef i ts--such as human rights
.
In conclusion, if US foreign policy continues as it has--promot ing
"containment
,
"
" low intensity wars," and support of dictatorial government s-
-nothing can be accompl ished through the use of polwar
. The US must real ize
that it cannot "sell" democracy on the Amer i can mode 1 everywhere i t chooses to
do so; also, it must begin to accept and support alternative forms of
government, even those which are based on a socialist approach. However,
such a change is unlikely in view of the fact that the public opinion which
could cause such a sensible redirection of US foreign policy seems pre-
programmed to provide the government with the support i t needs to continue its
present policies. Propaganda, like a gun, is merely an instrument, to be
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used for good or ill.
detriment of the count
world.
Its current use by the US government is working to the
ry s real interests as well as those of the rest of the
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Comrrand Relations
COORDINATION RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL WARFARE STAFF
AND GENERAL STAFF IN THE CHINESE ARMED FORCES
TROOP UNITS
This chart shows command relationships in a type headquarters. The Chief of
Staff in a type headquarters is responsible for coordination in the general and special
staff while the director of the political warfare establishment is responsible for coordi-
nation ot political warfare functions. Both of them report to the commander and
deputy commander. On the regimental and lower level where there is no chief of
staff, the chief of the political warfare establishment or political warfare officer of the
unit is on the deputy commander level.
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The functions of the Political Warfare Planning Committee are to study, plan and
review:
a. Political warfare policies.
b. Civil affairs policies.
c. Political warfare operations behind the enemy’s lines.
The Military Spokesman’s Office is responsible for:
a. News release concerning joint operations.
b. Speaking to the public on behalf of the Ministry of National Defense.
c. Arranging both Chinese and foreign reporters to visit military units.
P-1 is responsible for
a. Formulating plans of political warfare operations.
b. Management of political warfare personnel.
c. Organization and training.
d. Political warfare personnel service and evaluation of their efficiencies.
e. Political warfare operations in the enemy’s rear area.
P-2 is responsible for:
a. Psychological warfare activities.
b. Culture and propaganda activities within Armed Forces.
c. Recreational activities.
P-3 is responsible for conducting administrative, tactical and technical inspections and the
supervision of discipline within the Armed Forces.
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P-4 is responsible for:
a. Providing political warfare intelligence.
b. Safeguarding military security.
c. Providing counter-espionage measures.
d. Providing security clearances.
P-5 is responsible for:
a. Handling military-civilian programs.
b. Planning welfare programs and providing welfare services for officers and EM.
c. Providing services to military dependents.
P-6 is responsible for:
a. Providing political education for both active duty and reserve personnel.
b. Conducting political training activities.
c. Planning physical training programs.
The Comptroller Office prepares and reviews budgets and distributes GPWD operational
funds. This office also prepares statistical analysis of political warfare activities and procures,
manages and adjusts equipment utilized in political warfare activities.
The Administrative Office handles social relations, screens and controls overall clerical
work, and renders administrative support to the various staff sections.
As can be seen most of the functions in the political establishment of the Chinese
Armed Forces also exist in U.S. military units. The difference lies wherein several functions
regarded as separate or additional duties and assigned to separate U.S. general and special
staff sections are combined and discharged as a whole in the Chinese Armed Forces by the
political establishment.
POLITICAL
STAFF
COLLEGE
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Supporting Units
There are sixteen supporting or operational units which are under the direct command
of MND and supervised by GPWD to carry out the political warfare activities. These sixteen
units arc shown on the following chart:
POLITICAL WARFARE OPERATIONAL UNITS AND
SERVICES SUBORDINATE TO MND
1ST
CIVIL
AFFAIRS
GROUP
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DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL WARFARE
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POLITICAL WARFARE INSIGNIA
The Political Warfare insignia is a badge, worn above the right breast
pocket, which consists of a silver star symbolizing leadership, surrounded
by a hexagonal design symbolizing Chiang Kai-shek' s "Six Great Warfares"*
superimposed on a sword, anchor, and wings which symbolize the role of the
Amy, Navy, and Air Force in the carrying out of the six warfare missions.
Ideological Warfare, Stratagem Warfare, Mass Warfare,
Organizational Warfare, and Psychological Warfare.
* Six Great Warfares:
Intelligence Warfare,
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